3.4 The author maintains that article 18, paragraph 1, of the Covenant has been violated, and asserts that Ramón Sampedro’s decision was based on freedom of thought and conscience and the right to manifest his personal beliefs through practices or deeds. She claims that Mr. Sampedro was reduced to “enslavement to a morality he did not share, imposed by the power of the State, and forced to exist in a state of constant suffering”. interference by the State in the exercise of his freedom, and his right to equal treatment. The European Court pronounced the application inadmissible ratione personae, on the ground that the heir of Ramón Sampedro was not entitled to continue his complaints. With reference to the alleged excessive duration of the proceedings, the European Court stated that, even if the author could be considered a victim, in the circumstances the duration of proceedings had not been so great as to lead to the conclusion of a clear violation of the Convention; it accordingly declared the complaint manifestly ill-founded. 3.5 The author maintains that article 9 of the Covenant has been violated in that the liberty of the individual may only be restricted if the law establishes such restrictions and only when they constitute necessary means of protecting public security, order, health or morals or the rights or fundamental freedoms of others. She asserts that State interference in Mr. Sampedro’s decision cannot be equated with any of these hypotheses, and furthermore, the right to freedom must be envisaged as the right to do anything that does not impair the rights of others; the alleged victim requested euthanasia only for himself and not for others, for which reason the interference of the State in his decision was unjustified. The complaint 3.1 The author argues that in, considering the intervention of a doctor to help Mr. Ramón Sampedro to die as an offence, the State party was in breach of the latter’s right to privacy without arbitrary interference, as provided for in article 17 of the Covenant. The author contends that, as the alleged victim stated in his book, he requested euthanasia for himself alone and not for other persons, and that accordingly the interference of the State in his decision was unjustified. 3.6 The author maintains that the right to equal protection of the law as set out in article 2, paragraph 1, and in article 26 of the Covenant has been violated. In her opinion, it is paradoxical that the State should respect the decision of a person committing suicide but not that of disabled persons. She argues that any self-sufficient person who is mobile and experiences extreme suffering is able to commit suicide and will not be prosecuted if he does not succeed, unlike a person whose range of action is severely restricted, as in the case of Ramón Sampedro, who was reduced to complete immobility and could not be assisted, on pain of criminal prosecution. In the author’s opinion, this constitutes discrimination vis-à-vis the law. She considers that the State, as the embodiment of the community, has the obligation to be understanding and to act humanely with a sick person who does not wish to live, and must not punish any person who assists him in carrying out his determination to die; otherwise, it incurs the risk of an unjust difference of treatment with regard to a person who is capable of action and wishes to die. 3.2 The author contends that the State’s “criminal interference” in Ramón Sampedro’s decision constituted a violation of his right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, as provided for in article 7 of the Covenant; the tetraplegia from which he suffered had considerable repercussions on his daily life as he was never able to get up. He required the assistance of other persons in order to eat, dress himself and attend to all his needs, including the most intimate; and the lack of mobility to which circumstances condemned him entailed accumulated and unbearable suffering for him. The author contends that, although in this case the suffering was not caused directly by the voluntary intervention of a State agent, the conduct of the State organs was not neutral, since a criminal provision prevented Mr. Sampedro from ending his life with the assistance that was essential in order to enable him to achieve his purpose. The author stresses that the situation created by the State party’s legislation constituted ill-treatment for Ramón Sampedro and caused him to lead a degrading life. 3.7 The author states that article 14 of the Covenant was violated because the Constitutional Court refused to acknowledge her legitimacy in the proceedings regarding Mr. Sampedro. She claims compensation from the State for the violations of the Covenant perpetrated against Mr. Sampedro when he was alive. 3.3 The author asserts that there has been a violation of article 6 of the Covenant, arguing that life as protected by the Covenant refers not only to biological life, under any circumstances, but to a life of dignity, in contrast to the humiliating situation Mr. Sampedro suffered for over 29 years. She maintains that the right to life does not mean the obligation to bear torment indefinitely, and that the pain suffered by Ramón Sampedro was incompatible with the notion of human dignity. The State party’s admissibility submission and author’s comments and merits 4.1 The State party, in its written submission dated 2 January 2002, maintains that the communication is 36