punishment is the ‘weakest’ level of violation of article 7, in which the severity of suffering is less important than the level of humiliation or debasement to the victim.30 High Commissioner for Refugees, the possibilities of which were well advertised. The author was at all times treated humanely at the MIDC, and his physical and mental integrity and well-being were afforded particularly high priority, over and above the level of ordinary care, by MIDC staff. For example, following his complaints about noise levels, MIDC staff reduced the volume level on the announcement system and reduced the number of times the system was used during the day. Further, when he complained of being unable to sleep because of noise in the dormitory area, alternative sleeping arrangements were offered to him. Similarly, prior to his actual release into family care, MIDC staff arranged for him to be taken out to his family on a fortnightly basis so that he could have a meal with them and get a break from the routine of the IDC. Eventually, on 10 August 1994, the author was released on an ongoing basis into the care of his family when it became apparent that his psychological state warranted this measure. Further, at all times he was provided with adequate and professional medical attention. 4.7 Accordingly, it is clear that while particularly harsh conditions of detention may constitute a violation of article 7 (whether the suffering is physical or psychological), detention, in and of itself, is not a violation of article 7. In Vuolanne v. Finland, the Committee expressed the view that “for punishment to be degrading, the humiliation or debasement must exceed a particular level and must, in any event, entail other elements beyond the mere fact of deprivation of liberty”.31 Similarly, the Committee has consistently expressed the view that, even prolonged periods of detention on “death row” do not violate article 7.32 For detention to violate article 7 there must be some element of reprehensibleness in the treatment of detainees. 4.8 Assessing the general conditions of immigration detention in the light of these standards, the State party emphasizes that to ensure the wellbeing of all persons in immigration detention, it has instituted Immigration Detention Standards that govern the living conditions of detainees within its detention facilities and specify the distinctive nature of services that are required in an immigration detention environment. These standards address protection of the privacy of detainees; health care and safety; spiritual, social, educational and recreational activities; interpreters; and training of detention centre staff in cultural diversity and the like. The State party submits that conditions at the MIDC are humane and such as to ensure the comfort of residents while they are awaiting the outcome of their visa applications. 4.10 Turning to the development of the author’s paranoid schizophrenia, the State party contends that there is a convincing body of literature indicating that a predisposition for schizophrenia is genetically determined.33 Thus, while it is deeply unfortunate that the author’s schizophrenic symptoms developed while in detention, he is likely to have been predisposed to develop the condition, and the development of this condition does not necessarily reflect the conditions under which he was detained. While acknowledging that any deprivation of liberty may cause some psychological stress, such emotional stress does not amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (and certainly does not constitute a punishment). In any case, medical evidence indicates that the development of schizophrenia is not linked to the experience of a “gross stressor”. 4.9 Turning to the author’s particular situation, at no time during his detention did he make a complaint to DIMA, the Commonwealth Ombudsman, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission or the United Nations Uruguay, No. 33/1978; Massiotti v. Uruguay, No. 25/1978; Bequio v. Uruguay, No. 88/1981; Cariboni v. Uruguay, No. 159/1983; and Portorreal v. Dominican Republic, No. 188/1984. 33 Davidson, G.C. and Neale, J.M. (1994), Abnormal Psychology (6th ed.), John Wiliey & Sons, Brisbane; Gottesman, I.I., McGuffin, P. and Farmer, A.E. (1987), Clinical genetics as “clues” to the real genetics of schizophrenia, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 13, 23-47; Dworking, R.H., Lenzenwenger, M.F. and Moldin, S.O. (1987), Genetics and the phenomenology of schizophrenia. In P.D. Harvey and E.F. Walker (Eds.), Positive and negative symptoms of psychosis, Elrbaum, Hillsdale, NJ; Gottesman, I.I. and Shields, J. (1972), Schizophrenia and genetics: A twin study vantage point, Academic Press, New York; Rosenthal, D. (1970), Genetic theory and abnormal behaviour, McGraw-Hill, New York; and Fischer, M. (1971), Psychosis in the offspring of schizophrenic monozygotic twins and their normal co-twins, British Journal of Psychiatry, 118, 43-52. 30 Such acts include arbitrary detention practices aimed at humiliating prisoners and making them feel insecure (for example, repeated solitary confinement, submission to cold and persistent relocation to a new cell): Conteris v. Uruguay, No. 139/1983, and women prisoners hanging naked from handcuffs: Isoriano de Bouton v. Uruguay No. 37/1978 and Arzuaga Gilbao v. Uruguay No. 147/1983. 31 Op. cit., at 9.2. 32 Graham v. Jamaica, No. 461/1991; Kindler v. Canada, No. 470/1991; Johnson v. Jamaica, No. 588/1994; Chaplin v. Jamaica, No. 596/1994. 147