protection of minorities did not discharge that burden. The Court also distinguished the Committee’s Views of violation in Ballantyne et al. v. Canada, noting that in that case a requirement for exclusive use of French had been at issue. appeal court, in order to discharge this burden of proof (they had not adduced any below, because the trial judge found that the State carried this onus, and had not discharged it). The authors contend that the appeal court wrongly believed they did not want to adduce any evidence. 2.7 The application of the authors’ corporation for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed on 12 December 2002. 3.4 Finally, the authors argue that the State party has failed to implement its Covenant obligations, in breach of article 2, paragraphs 2 and 3, by the insufficient coverage in domestic law of Covenant obligations and the failure of the courts in the present case appropriately to assess the complaint from a Covenant perspective. The complaint 3.1 The authors note, at the outset, that Québec’s language laws have been considered by the Committee in Ballantyne et al. v. Canada, McIntyre v. Canada and Singer v. Canada.5 In Ballantyne et al., the Committee found that provisions of the Charter of the French Language which, at that time, prohibited advertising in English, violated article 19, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, but not articles 26 and 27. In Singer, the Committee found that amended provisions, which required external advertising to be in French, but which allowed inside advertising in other languages in some circumstances, constituted a violation of article 19, paragraph 2, in the case (concerning external signage). The present “marked predominance” provisions which the authors challenge came into effect after the Singer case was registered, but prior to the Committee’s Views. The Committee there noted that it had not been asked to consider whether the present provisions complied with the Covenant, but concluded that they afforded the author an effective remedy in the particular circumstances of his case. State party’s submission on admissibility and authors’ comments 4.1 By submissions of 6 April 2004, the State party contested the admissibility of the communication. Firstly, the State party argues that a corporation does not enjoy the rights protected by the Covenant. It contends that the corporation “Les Enterprises W.F.H. Ltée” was the entity prosecuted and convicted for breach of the Charter of the French Language. In Canadian law, a corporation is separate from its shareholders, with legal personality. Creditors of a corporation cannot recover debts from a shareholder. Corporations are also differently taxed from natural persons. The authors, therefore, cannot domestically claim to be separate persons and benefit from special rules applying to corporations but, before the Committee, lift the corporate veil and claim individual rights. The State party thus relies on the Committee’s jurisprudence that where an author of the communication was a corporation,6 or where the victim of alleged violations was in fact the individual’s corporation,7 the communication is inadmissible. 3.2 The authors contend that their right to freedom of expression under article 19, paragraph 2, is infringed by the prescription of any particular language in private commercial activity. They claim that restrictions on use of language are not warranted by the ‘necessity’ qualifier in article 19, paragraph 3, and that the Supreme Court of Canada was wrong to uphold any language restrictions as reasonable and warranted. They also claim that the requirement to use “markedly predominant” French in advertising violates their right to equality under article 2, paragraph 1; that it violates their right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of language under article 26; and that it violates their rights as members of a national minority (the English speaking minority in Québec) in accordance with article 27. 4.2 Secondly, the State party argues that even if the Committee were to regard a corporation as being able to enjoy some substantive Covenant rights, it would not follow that a corporation would be able to submit a communication. The Committee has repeatedly held that only individuals, personally, could submit a communication.8 In addition, the Committee has held that domestic remedies had been exhausted by the corporation, rather than the author’s name. The same applies presently. 3.3 In relation to article 14, the authors claim that, on appeal, the court found the authors had the onus of proving that the special legislative measures to protect the French language were not warranted and justified under the Canadian Charter. The authors allege that they offered to adduce evidence to the 5 6 A newspaper publishing company v. Trinidad and Tobago. Case No. 360/1989, Decision adopted on 14 July 1989, and A publication and a printing company v. Trinidad and Tobago. Case No. 361/1989, Decision adopted on 14 July 1989. 7 S.M. v. Barbados. Case No. 502/1992, Decision adopted on 31 March 1994, and Lamagna v. Australia. Case No. 737/1997, Decision adopted on 7 April 1999. 8 359/1989, 385/1989, 455/1991. 47 Ibid.