OPCAT ratifications and signatories in OSCE States:    23 OSCE participating States are States Parties to the OPCAT 16 OSCE participating States have signed but not ratified the OPCAT (several signed in the period from 2003-2005 but have yet to progress to ratification) 17 OSCE participating States are neither States Parties nor signatories to the OPCAT An overview of the implementation of the Protocol in OSCE countries reveals a mixed picture. It should be noted that implementation has been relatively slow in all OSCE participating States concerned, with the deadline set in the Protocol for the creation or designation of NPMs having been missed almost universally. 26 It may be that this deadline was overly optimistic. It may not have taken sufficient account of the time needed for public debate to create new mechanisms or of legislative and other changes needed to existing bodies in order for them to fulfil the Protocol criteria. However, in many OSCE countries this process is ongoing. In many cases there has already been some indication as to which bodies may eventually be designated, even if no final decision has been reached. For example, existing Ombudsman institutions seem to have been a popular choice as possible NPMs, and many already have a mandate to visit places of deprivation of liberty. Some might, however, need increased or revised powers to be OPCAT compliant, such as the right to visit all places of deprivation of liberty or to submit proposals on draft legislation. Challenges that have arisen in the selection of Ombudsman institutions as the sole NPM include the fact that these institutions may not have sufficient resources or expertise to carry out the regular visits to many different types of detention facilities envisaged by the Protocol. Additionally, they often have a mandate to take up individual cases of alleged torture or ill-treatment, which could conflict with the cooperative and consultative role envisaged between the NPM and the authorities under OPCAT. These institutions might also be accustomed to operating only within a national, rather than an international legal framework, and would thus need additional training to be effective NPMs. These issues have been examined in depth in a publication from the Association for the Prevention of Torture. 27 In certain countries, existing Ombudsman offices have been criticized for being too closely linked to the President or current government, and thus lacking the independence required of an NPM. Finally, it has been argued that the designation of a new body rather than an existing one sends a signal to the public that torture 26 Article 24 of the OPCAT allows States Parties to postpone their obligation to create an NPM for a period of three years from the date of their ratification, and a further two years under certain conditions, but this provision has not as yet been used. 27 “National Human Rights Commissions and Ombudspersons’ Offices/ Ombudsmen as National Preventive Mechanisms under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture”, January 2008, available on the Association for the Prevention of Torture website <http://www.apt.ch/component/option,com_docman/task,cat_view/gid,51/Itemid,59/lang,en/>. 34