CAT/C/36/D/273/2005 Page 6 extensive and detailed guidelines. It is subject to judicial review, and there is no authority for the proposition that a discretionary remedy cannot be an effective remedy, for purposes of admissibility9. 4.3 Further, the complainant has not yet filed an application on the basis of humanitarian and compassionate considerations, which the State party maintains would also be an available and effective domestic remedy. The assessment of a humanitarian and compassionate application, under section 25 of the IRPA, consists of a broad, discretionary review by an officer who determines whether a person should be granted permanent residence in Canada for humanitarian and compassionate reasons. The test is whether the person would suffer unusual, underserved or disproportionate hardship if he had to apply for a permanent resident visa from outside Canada. The as sessing officer considers all the relevant information, including the person’s written submissions. A humanitarian and compassionate application can be based on allegations of risk, in which case the officer assesses the risk the person may face in the country to which he would be returned. Included in the assessment are considerations of the risk of being subjected to unduly harsh or inhumane treatment, as well as current country conditions. In the event that such an application is granted, the person rece ives permanent residency subject to medical and security screening which can eventually lead to Canadian citizenship. 4.4 For the State party, the humanitarian and compassionate consideration application is also an effective remedy which should be exhausted, contrary to the Committee’s jurisprudence10. The State party argues that the simple fact that a remedy is discretionary does not necessarily mean that it is not effective 11. It invokes a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in which the court determined that a discretionary remedy available to unsuccessful refugee claimants in Germany to prevent removal to a substantial risk of torture was adequate to fulfill Germany’s obligations under article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights 12. Furthermore, while the decision adopted in humanitarian and compassionate applications is technically discretionary, it is in fact guided by defined standards and procedures and must be exercised in a manner consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Canada’s international obligations. In the event that the application is refused, the person can make an application for leave to apply for judicial review to the Federal Court on the standard of “reasonableness simpliciter”, which means that the ‘discretion’ is far from absolute. 4.5 The State party challenges the Committee’s reasoning in Falcon Ríos to the effect “that the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies requires the petitioner to use remedies that are directly related to the risk of torture in the country to which he would be sent, not those that might allow him to stay where he is” 13 . The State party argues that article 3 of the 9 T.I. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 43844/98, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 2000-III; Communication No. 250/2004 A.H. v. Sw eden, inadmissibility decision of 15 November 2005. The State party also refers to Communication No. 939/2000, Dupuy v. Canada, inadmissibility decision of 18 March 2005, paragraph 7.3 (HRC), concerning the effectiveness of judicial review of an application for mercy to the Minister of Justice. 10 The State party refers, inter alia, to Communication No. 133/1999, Falcon Ríos v. Canada, Views adopted on 23 November 2004, paragraph 7.3. 11 The State party refers to Communication No. 169/2000, G.S.B. v. Canada, discontinued by letter of the Committee dated 25 November 2005, in which a failed refugee’s humanitarian and compassionate consideration application was granted. 12 T.I. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 43844/98, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 2000-III, paragraph 460. 13 Communication No. 133/1999, Falcon Ríos v. Canada, Views adopted on 23 November 2004, paragraph 7.4.