also threw up the fact that some prisoners expressed their satisfaction at being in the company of people sharing the same commitments, which set them apart from the rest of the prison population. Others, on the other hand, shared their sense of being treated like "plague victims" and were baffled as to why they had been lumped together with people closely involved in a violent process. All of the people placed in these UDs were assigned because of the terrorist nature of the court order that had been issued against them rather than, as explained in the beginning, on the basis of their risk of Islamist radicalisation. The voluntary nature of this placement appeared to be completely idealistic. The detection grids (since amended) did not appear to be used in a uniform manner, and there were questions over the reliability of the data collected and its processing. Once again, the CGLPL had doubts over the specific nature of the prison regime in use in UDs: a sui generis system, halfway between ordinary detention and solitary confinement, not grounded in any specific legal framework, which the prison administration continued to consider as perfectly normal. And yet, the Act of 3 June 2016 stepping up the fight against organised crime and terrorism has since brought this extraordinary situation to an end by grounding it in a legal framework and providing (Article 726-2 of the Criminal Procedure Code/CPP) for appeal before the administrative judge against assignment decisions. The CGLPL has considered that placement in UDs – sometimes decided without consulting with judges or against their opinion – was a burden on the judicial pathway of the people concerned, which may constitute a pre-sentence and undermine rights of defence. It became apparent that it was not admissible to cite the difficulties linked to prison overcrowding by way of justification for placing prisoners (accommodated in single cells) in specific wings, when this use – according to the interviews conducted – above all makes it easier to do whatever one likes with the people concerned. The CGLPL considered that the chosen model (experimental) should be subject to a clarification regarding the code of conduct, since the role of some professionals involved has not been sufficiently defined, giving rise to confusion that could be detrimental to the prisoners concerned. Add to that the fact that the information given to the prison population concerned population seems to have been woefully insufficient and unreliable (not least as regards the length of stays in the UD and criteria for subsequent assignment). In light of the stakes involved and surge in judicial information for acts of terrorism associated with radical Islam, extension of this model did not strike the CGLPL as realistic. The CGLPL pointed out that detained women and minors were not subject to any specific supervision – no more than people detained for so-called common law acts were. The Minister of Justice replied to this report on 6 July 2016. He noted that no decision had been made to extend dedicated units. The scheme remained "experimental until such time as its coherence, operationality and relevance had been assessed". The Minister was anxious to highlight that grouping together did not imply a complete shutoff from the rest of the prisoners, but – as had been mentioned in the CGLPL's report – was "simply aimed at facilitating the management of the prisoners without isolating them from the rest of the prison population". Other groups of offenders identified as being "radical" could "possibly" be assigned to UDs "once stability had been achieved regarding the detection tools". Moreover, outside UDs, radicalisation prevention programmes were planned across 27 prisons. On 25 October 2016, the Minister of Justice announced a plan on tackling violent radicalisation, which significantly amends the previous scheme and 46