protecting these rights and provide too weak a legal framework with regard to the breach of rights that such a system represents. Indeed, the application criteria set out in the Act are too vague. In particular, it takes account, not of the objective to protect the person, but of the risk of impact on public order resulting from a possible suicide; this criterion could allow for the installation of video surveillance for a very large number of prisoners, when such a system must remain exceptional. What is more, the Act does not stipulate a maximum length of time at the end of which such surveillance must cease. Given that criminal proceedings can sometimes drag on for a very long time, such a system could remain in place for several years at a time, which appears to constitute a disproportionate breach of the fundamental rights of the people concerned. Lastly, the Act only provides for the option of asking for a physician, and not an obligation. By way of comparison, the periodic attendance of a physician in the solitary confinement wing is compulsory so as to determine how compatible the person's state of health is with such a measure. A similar obligation also seems necessary in this instance. For all these reasons, the Chief Inspector does not consider these measures concerning video surveillance in cells to be sufficient to guarantee that the fundamental rights of the people subject thereto are protected. Moreover, she believes that such a system – far from protecting the person – may actually increase the suicide risk given the significant intrusion into the person's privacy it entails – stripping the person as it does of any sense of privacy. She points out that more training and vigilance on the part of staff coupled with continuous presence and regular, attentive conversation with the person concerned by the surveillance system would achieve both the objectives bearing on the security and protection of the person – whilst respecting his or her fundamental rights. The CGLPL reiterates its opposition to the principle of video surveillance in cells. That said, if the consensus is that this cannot be avoided, under exceptional circumstances, then at the very least its legal supervision must be bolstered. What matters is to keep this measure exceptional, by providing that it can only be taken with a view to protecting a prisoner rather than to meeting the expectations of public opinion, that it be subject to regular scrutiny and that it be limited to a strict timescale. Video surveillance must not replace human presence around the person being protected. 2.2 The consequences of the opinion dated 12 July 2011 relating to access to computers by prisoners In this opinion, the CGLPL asked the prison administration to more effectively guarantee the prisoners' freedom of communication, acknowledged by the Constitutional Council, wit hout any limits other than those imposed by security, public order, the future of the prisoners and the rights of their victims. To help with prisoners' rehabilitation, it was recommended that the rules of accessing computers, concerning the acquisition of hardware, storage capacities, access to the Internet and an electronic messaging service, be made more flexible and harmonised, in compliance with security requirements. In view of persisting reports that computer use in prisons continues to be problemati c, the Contrôleur général des lieux de privation de liberté decided to conduct an on -site inspection pursuant to Article 6-1 of the Act of 30 October 2007. Through these measures, the CGLPL was able to observe that, despite the recommendations issued five years ago, access to online services in prisons had made precious little progress. This is why, when these investigations had come to an end, the CGLPL issued the prison administration with new recommendations 12. 12 Letter dated 22 April 2016 to the Prison Administration Director. 57