such activities; and (iv) scars on the body of a person suspected of LTTE involvement. In case of firm evidence of LTTE involvement, a person can be detained for a period of up to 18 months under the Emergency Regulations or the Prevention of Terrorism Act. 4.4With respect to the complainant’s claim under article 3 of the Convention, the State party submits that, even if a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights existed in Sri Lanka, that would not as such constitute a sufficient ground for determining that a particular person would be at risk of being subjected to torture upon return to that country. According to the Committee’s jurisprudence,d specific grounds must exist indicating that the individual concerned would be personally at risk of being subjected to torture. The State party also refers to the Committee’s jurisprudence that “substantial grounds” in article 3 require more than a mere possibility of torture.e 4.5In the State party’s view, the complainant would not run a real, personal and foreseeable risk of being tortured if he were returned to Sri Lanka. The mere fact that he is a Tamil does not in itself constitute sufficient grounds to establish such a risk. Moreover, the State party submits that the complainant’s statements lack credibility, reflected by the contradiction in his statements concerning his wife’s pregnancies and the circumstances of his stay in Mullaitivu. The State party submits that this explanation differs in essential points from his earlier statements and that such discrepancy cannot be explained solely by the allegedly poor quality of the translation of the complainant’s statements. Even if his cultural background prevented the complainant from speaking about his wife’s miscarriage, there was no need for him to have made incorrect statements about his stay in Mullaitivu. The State party also considers his credibility undermined by his statements regarding his escape from the military camp in Trincomalee. It was unlikely that he could escape from the camp without any difficulty, while Sri Lankan soldiers stood watching. 4.6The State party adds that the complainant has not convincingly established that the Sri Lankan authorities would treat him as a suspect. His claim that he would encounter problems with the authorities was based on speculation unsupported by objective facts, the only evidence substantiating his claims being the letters from his family and friends. With respect to possible sanctions by LTTE should the complainant return to the LTTE controlled part of Sri Lanka, the State party argues that such sanctions fall outside the definition of torture in article 1 and, therefore, outside the scope of article 3 of the Convention. Since according to article 1, “the term ‘torture’ means any act … inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”, acts by non-State entities such as LTTE could not, for the purposes of the Convention, be considered to constitute torture.f 4.7As to the Amnesty International medical examination group report, the State party submits that it merely confirms that the complainant’s medical symptoms are partly consistent with his allegations; it does not imply that he had satisfactorily established that these symptoms, as well as scars on his body, were the result of torture. 4.8The State party concludes that, in the light of the general situation in Sri Lanka and the personal circumstances of the complainant, no substantial grounds exist for believing that the complainant would run a real, personal and foreseeable risk of being subjected to torture upon his return to Sri Lanka, in violation of article 3 of the Convention. Complainant’s comments on the State party’s submissions 5.1Counsel submits that the complainant was precluded from contesting the IND decision of 20 May 1999 on the merits because he had already objected to the IND failure to take a timely decision on his asylum application, thereby losing the possibility to submit arguments on the substance of his application to IND before bringing the case to court. 5.2With regard to the medical evidence, counsel criticizes the fact that the medical advice sought from BMA was limited to the question of whether the complainant’s medical condition required his admission as a refugee without examining the issue of whether his medical complaints as well as his scars corroborated his allegations of torture. Counsel further claims that the State party has failed to appreciate the weight of the medical report by the Amnesty International medical examination group, whose reports are only issued in a small number of credible cases. 5.3As regards the general situation in Sri Lanka, counsel complains that the State party primarily based its assessment on the country reports issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, without considering other relevant sources. 5.4With respect to the State party’s challenge to the complainant’s credibility, counsel denies that his client’s statements were inconsistent. He submits that the State party’s observation that the complainant qualified the interview translation as “poor” is a simplification of his argument. What he emphasized were the different possibilities of translating the word “hiding” into Dutch, each carrying with it a different meaning. 5.5Counsel submits that the complainant cannot reasonably be expected to prove in detail how his release from the military hospital in Trincomalee came about. 5.6As to the complainant’s personal risk of being tortured upon return to Sri Lanka, counsel submits that his reputation as a karate teacher increases this risk. In this respect, counsel criticizes the State party’s failure to consider the statements on the complainant’s karate background which his brother made in the context of his asylum application in the Netherlands. According to these statements, the complainant had left Sri Lanka in 1984 to live in Qatar (until 1987) because he was suspected of training LTTE militants. Furthermore, counsel argues that the fact that the complainant was tortured in the past, combined with the general danger of LTTE suspects being tortured, connotes a high risk that he would be detained and subjected to torture if he were to be returned to Sri Lanka. This risk was increased by the likelihood that the complainant’s name had been entered into the database of the National Intelligence Bureau when he was arrested in Trincomalee in 1996. Counsel considers it likely that, during a routine screening of rejected Tamil asylum-seekers by the Sri Lankan authorities, the complainant’s arrest and detention in the military camp would come to light together with the information that he had worked as a karate teacher in Jaffna. Moreover, the scars on his body would raise the suspicion that he had been involved in the armed struggle of LTTE. Counsel concludes that the combination of these facts would expose the complainant to a high personal risk of being subjected to torture going beyond a “mere possibility”.