CEDAW/C/78/D/130/2018 following her torture, the authorities were clearly attempting to punish her for and force her to cease her women’s rights work and to discourage her from breaking gender norms. 3.3 Also in violation of article 1 of the Convention, the authorities arbitrarily arrested and unlawfully detained the author on 19 July, 9 August and 11–12 August 2012. On 19 July 2012, the vehicle in which she was a passenger was stopped on the ground that it had to be checked for explosives, but there was no basis for any such suspicion and she was instead questioned on unrelated matters. On 9 August 2012, the Martyrs of 17 February Brigade took her from her hotel to a compound, where a Ministry of Defence official questioned her. On 11 August 2012, she was again arbitrarily arrested by the Brigade and detained and tortured. None of the arrests was based on Libyan law; she was never served with a warrant or charged with a crime; and she had no access to a lawyer. The arrests and detentions were therefore unreasonable and unnecessary. 3.4 Furthermore, in contravention of article 1 of the Convention, the State party violated the author’s right to freedom of expression. She had organized a demonstration, collaborated with documentary makers and spoken out in interviews and on television about women’s rights. In view of the fact that the authorities arrested her during a women’s rights workshop and interrogated her about her activities as a defender of the human rights of women and about her NGO, this treatment must be considered as partially motivated by her exercise of the right to freedom of expression. She submits that her actions did not threaten national security or public order and that the restrictions imposed were clearly disproportionate. 3.5 The State party also breached the author’s right to freedom of asso ciation under article 1 of the Convention. She had founded and run Hakki, a women’s rights organization, but in response, the authorities arrested, detained and tortured her and questioned her about the organization, which they called a “prostitution organ ization” supporting Jews and Israel. She submits that the restrictions on her exercise of the right to freedom of association were disproportionate and discriminatory and intimidated her into ceasing to run the organization. 3.6 Referring to the Committee’s general recommendation No. 19 (1992) on violence against women 6 and its decision in M.E.N. v. Denmark, 7 the author argues that the treatment to which she was subjected was discriminatory and constituted gender-based violence, as it was directed against her as a woman and aimed at stopping her from working on women’s rights. She argues that the treatment sho uld be understood in the context of a pattern of discrimination against women in Libya and a patriarchal culture in which deeply rooted stereotypes have persisted after the 2011 revolution. 8 3.7 The author also submits that the State party has breached her rights under article 2 (d) of the Convention, as she was targeted as a woman breaking gender norms and was subjected to gender-specific treatment designed to intimidate her into ceasing her women’s rights work. 3.8 The author further submits that the State party has violated her rights under article 3 of the Convention, which she submits covers the State party’s obligations to __________________ 6 7 8 21-04766 Para. 6. CEDAW/C/55/D/35/2011, para. 8.6. The author refers to: report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders (see A/70/217), paras. 61–62; report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders (A/HRC/16/44), para. 21; CEDAW/C/LBY/CO/5, para. 21; CCPR/C/LBY/CO/4, para. 11; letter from Amnesty International dated 18 October 2012; Human Rights Watch, “A revolution for all: women’s rights in the new Libya”, May 2013, p. 13; Amnesty International, “Annual report: Libya 2013”. 5/10