Annex Individual opinion of Olivier de Frouville 1. I agree with the Committee’s findings regarding the violations that it attributes to the State party, as set forth in paragraph 9 of its Views. However, I cannot support the Committee’s approach to the author’s claims under article 19 of the Covenant. In paragraph 8.7 of its Views, the Committee interprets the author’s claim to mean that he considers his criminal conviction on the basis of article 144 of the Criminal Code for insulting a public official to be the sole factor for determining the violation in question. Yet the claim outlined in paragraph 3.5, which is admittedly somewhat ambiguous, demonstrates that the author’s complaint, in which he invokes the freedom of expression, does not relate solely to the above-mentioned conviction but also to his conviction for malicious accusation and defamation against the Director of ETGR. The alleged violation actually comprises a “composite” act, that is to say, a series of actions and omissions that include these two convictions, which served the dual purpose of intimidating the author in an effort to prevent him from speaking out and taking reprisals against him for reporting the reprehensible acts and practices he detected while working as an accountant at ETGR. 2. Article 19 of the Covenant protects the right of all persons to impart information but also the right of the public to receive it. As a matter of fact, it is broadly accepted today that States have the obligation, in order to implement the right to freedom of expression, to establish a legislative framework and practices that facilitate and protect the disclosure of information on matters of public interest, within the limits prescribed by article 19 (3). Drawing on recent developments in international law and the practices of States, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. David Kaye, defined a “whistle-blower” as “a person who exposes information that he or she reasonably believes, at the time of disclosure, to be true and to constitute a threat or harm to a specified public interest, such as a violation of national or international law, abuse of authority, waste, fraud, or harm to the environment, public health or public safety”.a Among other measures, the Special Rapporteur recommends that States provide “effective and protective channels for whistle-blowers to motivate remedial action”, and, in the absence of such channels, permit public disclosures; b avoid legal proceedings against whistle-blowers, save for “exceptional cases of the most serious demonstrable harm to a specific legitimate interest”;c and investigate reprisals and other attacks against whistle-blowers and hold the persons responsible for those acts accountable.d 3. In view of the facts that have been reported by the author and that have not been contested by the State party, it appears that the author falls firmly within the category of whistle-blower and that it was in his capacity as such that he suffered reprisals and acts of intimidation that constitute a serious violation of his right to freedom of expression. It is regrettable that the Committee has not acknowledged this fact or taken the opportunity to a b c d GE.16-23057 A/70/361, report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. David Kaye, 8 September 2015, para. 28. See also, in particular, the definition given in Recommendation CM/Rec (2014)7 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the protection of whistleblowers (30 April 2014). A/70/361, para. 64. See also the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in Guja v. Moldova, Application no. 14277/04, Grand Chamber judgment of 12 February 2008, para. 73 and Bucur and Toma v. Romania, Application no. 40238/02, judgment of 8 January 2013, para. 95 et seq. A/70/361, para. 65. Ibid., para. 66. 13