CCPR/C/122/D/2212/2012 the author stated that prison guards had tortured him, that he had been deprived of sleep and exposed to severe cold, and that his family had been threatened in an effort to secure confessions. He testified that some of the Government’s evidence had been obtained from him under duress. In response, the prosecutor presented Partizansky District Court of Minsk with a letter, dated 17 May 2011, signed by the Deputy Prosecutor of Minsk, stating that the author’s allegations had not been confirmed. The court did not order any further investigation of those allegations. The Committee recalls in that regard that, once a complaint about treatment contrary to article 7 of the Covenant has been filed, a State party must investigate it promptly and impartially. 23 The Committee further notes that the State party has failed to indicate how its respective authorities and courts investigated the author’s allegations that he was subjected to torture, ill-treatment and psychological pressure with the aim of obtaining a confession of guilt. In the circumstances, due weight must be given to the author’s claims, and the Committee considers that the facts as submitted disclose a violation of article 7 of the Covenant. 6.3 In the light of the above conclusions, the Committee does not find it necessary to examine separately the author’s claims under article 10 of the Covenant. 6.4 The Committee also recalls its previous jurisprudence that the wording of article 14 (3) (g) of the Covenant, that no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt, must be understood in terms of the absence of any direct or indirect physical or psychological pressure from the investigating authorities on the accused with a view to obtaining a confession of guilt. 24 The Committee also recalls that, in cases involving allegations of forced confessions, the burden is on the State to prove that statements made by the accused have been given of their own free will. 25 In the circumstances, the Committee concludes that the facts before it also disclose a violation of 14 (3) (g) of the Covenant. 6.5 The Committee notes the author’s claim, under article 9 of the Covenant, that the pretrial constraint measure applied to him and the continued extension of his remand in custody were unlawful, because they did not take into account the circumstances of the case and his individual circumstances. The author points out that neither the State party’s authorities that remanded him in custody nor the courts have provided any explanation as to why constraint measures envisaged in the Code of Criminal Procedure other than remand in custody and/or his release on bail could not have been applied in his case. The Committee notes that the author’s claims were brought to the attention of the State party’s relevant authorities and courts and were rejected by them in a perfunctory manner. The Committee recalls in that regard that the notion of “arbitrariness” is not to be equated with “against the law”, but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law, as well as elements of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality. 26 That means, inter alia, that remand in custody on criminal charges must be reasonable and necessary in all circumstances, for example, to prevent flight, interference with evidence or the recurrence of crime. 27 The State party has not demonstrated that those risks existed in the present case. In the absence of any further information, therefore, the Committee concludes that there has been a violation of article 9 (1) of the Covenant. 6.6 The Committee further notes the author’s claim that his remand in custody was sanctioned by the Prosecutor, who is not authorized by law to exercise judicial power, as required by article 9 (3) of the Covenant. The Committee recalls that the above-mentioned provision entitles a detained person charged with a criminal offence to judicial control of his/her detention. It is inherent to the proper exercise of judicial power that it be exercised by an authority that is independent, objective and impartial in relation to the issues dealt 23 24 25 26 27 See, for example, Aliev v. Ukraine (CCPR/C/78/D/781/1997), para. 7.2. See Berry v. Jamaica (CCPR/C/50/D/330/1988), para. 11.7; Singarasa v. Sri Lanka (CCPR/C/81/D/1033/2001), para. 7.4; and Deolall v. Guyana (CCPR/C/82/D/912/2000), para. 5.1. See Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32 (2007) on the right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, para. 41. See Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014) on liberty and security of person, para. 12. See, for example, Alphen v. Netherlands (CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988), para. 5.8. 11