CEDAW/C/62/D/56/2013 ill-treatment by a private person, without the consent or acquiescence of the relevant State. 9.3 The Committee recalls that article 1 of the Convention defines discrimination against women as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex, which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise by women … of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field”. It also recalls its general recommendation No. 19, which has clearly placed violence against women within the ambit of discrimination against women by stating that gender-based violence is a form of discrimination against women and includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. 9.4 In the present case, the Committee notes that the author’s claims are, in part, based on the fact that her daughter had been persecuted and sexually harassed by a private individual and her son had been detained by the police and later died in hospital. The Committee also notes the author’s claim that all her life she had been persecuted and sexually harassed because of her Christian faith. The author also claims to have been verbally abused and touched in intimate parts of her body by unknown men. The Committee observes, however, that the author has provided no clear and specific details about the persecution and sexual harassment that she claims to have endured throughout her life. Regarding the claimed incidents of harassment, the Committee notes that the information provided by the author is vague as to when those incidents took place, how often they happened and who the perpetrators were. The Committee also notes that, following her return to Pakistan, the author did not report any incidents of harassment. She also provided no other information excep t on her conversion to Islam, which was allegedly out of fear. On the basis of the limited information provided by the author and considering that she provided no explanation as to how the harassment of her children would constitute a personal risk to her, the Committee is unable to establish whether there was systematic harassment amounting to gender-based violence in the author’s case. In addition, the Committee notes that the author made no link between the alleged facts and the violation of the articles of the Convention that she invokes. In the circumstances, the Committee considers that the author has failed to sufficiently substantiate, for the purposes of admissibility, her claim that her removal to Pakistan would expose her to a real, personal and foreseeable risk of serious forms of gender-based violence. It therefore declares the communication inadmissible under article 4 (2) (c) of the Optional Protocol. In view of the above findings, the Committee does not consider it necessary to examine the other inadmissibility grounds put forward by the State party. 10. The Committee therefore decides: (a) That the communication is inadmissible under article 4 (2) (c) of the Optional Protocol; (b) author. 15-21608 That this decision shall be communicated to the State party and to the 7/7