OTHMAN (ABU QATADA) v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 65 199. For the second concern, the absence of a lawyer during interrogation, SIAC found that it was unlikely that the applicant would have a lawyer present during questioning by the GID, that it was likely that he would have a lawyer present for any questioning by the Public Prosecutor and very likely that he would have such representation for any appearance before a judge. Denial of access to a lawyer to a detainee, particularly during interrogation is a matter of serious concern: the right of a detainee to have access to legal advice is a fundamental safeguard against ill-treatment (Salduz, cited above, § 54). However, in the present case, that risk is substantially reduced by the other safeguards contained in the MOU and the monitoring arrangements. 200. Third, the Court would discount the risk that the applicant would be ill-treated if questioned by the CIA, that he would be placed in a secret GID or CIA “ghost” detention facility in Jordan, or that he would be subject to rendition to a place outside Jordan. In Babar Ahmad and Others, cited above, §§ 78-82 and 113-116, the Court observed that extraordinary rendition, by its deliberate circumvention of due process, was anathema to the rule of law and the values protected by the Convention. However, in that case, it found the applicants’ complaints that they would be subjected to extraordinary rendition to be manifestly ill-founded. Although the United States, which had requested their extradition, had not given any express assurances against rendition, it had given assurances that they would be tried before federal courts; the Court found rendition would hardly be compatible with those assurances. Similar considerations apply in the present case. Although rendition is not specifically addressed in the MOU, the MOU clearly contemplates that the applicant will be deported to Jordan, detained and retried for the offences for which he was convicted in absentia in 1998 and 1999. If he is convicted, he will be imprisoned in a GID detention facility. It would wholly incompatible with the MOU for Jordan to receive the applicant and, instead of retrying him, to hold him at an undisclosed site in Jordan or to render him to a third state. By the same token, even if he were to be interrogated by the United States authorities while in GID detention, the Court finds no evidence to cast doubt on SIAC’s conclusion that the Jordanian authorities would be careful to ensure that the United States did not “overstep the mark” by acting in a way which violated the spirit if not the letter of the MOU. 201. Fourth, it may well be that as matter of Jordanian law the MOU is not legally binding. Certainly, as an assurance against illegal behaviour, it should be treated with more scepticism than in a case where the State undertakes not to do what is permitted under domestic law (see paragraph 189(v) above). Nevertheless, SIAC appreciated this distinction. It is clear from its determination that SIAC exercised the appropriate caution that should attach to such an assurance (see its general findings on the MOU at