SHARING INFORMATION WITH STATES THAT TORTURE In one example of the shortcomings of such broad guidelines, a short illustrative list of prohibited practices is provided in its annex. Inevitably, such a list will be the primary tool used by officers to determine whether a practice is prohibited or not. Significantly, this list fails to examine the use of practices in combination, or other practices which have comparable effect on the victim. The annex itself over-simplifies a number of critical legal terms, being rather too brief to provide the detailed guidance necessary to avoid allegations of complicity in acts of torture, and provides an inaccurate description of the prohibition at international law. Nevertheless, there are some welcome provisions in the UK guidance, indicating for instance, that the agencies should review their practices to avoid the impression that their receipt of information “is an encouragement of the methods used to obtain it.”41 Furthermore, the guidance does provide for a number of actions to mitigate the risk of torture in the event that a risk of ill-treatment or torture is identified, including attaching conditions to requests and shared information. Canada Justice O’Connor’s inquiry in to the Mahar Arar case in Canada led to the 2011 publication of the ‘Ministerial Direction to Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS): Information sharing with foreign entities’.42 While the new Ministerial Directions deal with both sending and receiving of information that could in either case lead to torture, they are still very loosely worded and capable of vague interpretation. As with the UK Guidance, the Canadian Guidance offers rather inconsistent advice to its executive agents. The Direction states in the strongest terms that Canada opposes the mistreatment of any individual by any foreign entity for any purpose, but at the same time excuses itself from full adherence by expressing its own duty to its own citizens and allies of preventing harm that could be caused by individual engaging in threat related activities. 41 42 See UK guidance, para.28. Since the 2011 Direction, further ministerial Directions to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canada Border Services Agency emerged. Taken together, they are meant to establish a coherent and consistent policy on decisionmaking processes regarding information sharing where there may be a risk of mistreatment. 31