BEWARE THE GIFT OF POISON FRUIT Also comparable with the UK Guidance, the Canadian Direction states where there is a ‘substantial risk’ of mistreatment as a result of sharing information, the matter should be referred to the Service Director, who will balance the obligations. As with the UK guidance, this is a high threshold for action and above the international standard of appreciating a ‘real’ risk in determining the safety of action. Regarding inbound intelligence, the CSIS is directed not to knowingly rely upon information derived through mistreatment. One of the major problems with the 2011 Ministerial Direction is that it provides a defence in the event of ‘exceptional circumstances’: “[I]n exceptional circumstances, the CSIS may need to share the most complete information to mitigate a serious threat of loss of life, injury, or substantial damage or destruction of property before it materialises.” Such a defence could permit executive action which leads to torture or deportation, a possibility that was first introduced into Canadian law by the case of Suresh.43 The language of the directive clearly indicates that the Government intends to leave open the possibility that torture-tainted information or information which leads to torture may continue to be used without legal sanction. For basic reasons, the broad defence of ‘exceptional circumstances’ is hugely problematic. The idea that certain undefined ‘exceptional circumstances’ could justify sharing information with States that torture could open the floodgates to abuse and potentially encourage State actors to cooperate widely on the basis of subjective and illdefined concepts of necessity. Both the Canadian and UK guidelines place reliance on the assurances received from foreign agencies and States. The practice of relying on such unenforceable assurances from States which routinely torture raises a number of serious human rights concerns. Several experts, such as the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Committee against Torture have shown that such arrangements do not work in practice to protect persons from clear risks of torture 43 32 Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1.