SHARING INFORMATION WITH STATES THAT TORTURE observed, there are no reasons to prevent an intelligence oversight organ from reviewing agreements upon which intelligence sharing is based as well as intelligence sent to foreign entities. The real practical challenges in proving complicity with regards to torture committed overseas again underlines the overriding need for democratic oversight of intelligence agencies, which can request the information which could establish ‘knowledge’ for the purpose of a finding of complicity in acts of torture committed overseas. In a 2010 Joint Study on Global Practices in Relation to Secret Detention in the Context of Countering Terrorism, Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council recommended “any action by intelligence services should be governed by law, which in turn should be in conformity with international norms. To ensure accountability in intelligence cooperation, truly independent intelligence review and oversight mechanisms should be established and enhanced.”56 Pursuant to the Arar case, one of the principal findings of Justice O’Connor’s report on recommendations for oversight of intelligence services to prevent illegal intelligence methods and better review was that an integrated approach was essential to ensure there were no gaps between domestic oversight mechanisms. Practical training should be made available to give operational actors full instruction on these standards It is now common to require police and law enforcement officials to undergo ongoing training to abstain from torture and other forms of ill-treatment. Such training and syllabus development is often facilitated by interested NGOs and activists, but other relevant actors (such as professional legal associations) also play an important role. The effective prohibition and prevention of torture must also form a key part of the ongoing training delivered to security and intelligence officials, which should be dispersed into regular training, particularly in areas of key risk such as interviewing persons, and reducing the risks of torture when working with other agencies. We have seen that periods of tension and conflict can lead to a huge amount of pressure being left on all executive agencies to deliver results. In the period of aggressive counter-terrorism operations, 56 A/HRC/13/42, 19 February 2010. 41