68 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMED CONFLICT conflicts, this corresponds to the question of how remote the situation is from the battlefield, although new types of conflicts are characterized by the absence of frontlines and battlefields. What then constitutes sufficient control to warrant international human rights law predominating as the lex specialis? In an area on the territory of a State whose Government is fighting rebel forces, but which is neither under firm rebel nor under firm Government control, the impossibility to arrest the fighter, the danger inherent in attempting to arrest the fighter and the danger represented by the fighter to Government forces and civilians, as well as the immediacy of this danger, may lead to the conclusion that international humanitarian law is the lex specialis in that situation. In addition, where neither party has clear geographical control, the higher the degree of certainty that the target is actually a fighter, the easier the international humanitarian law approach appears as lex specialis.101 Even where international human rights law prevails as the lex specialis in the context of armed conflict, international humanitarian law remains in the background and may in some specific situations relax the international human rights law requirements of proportionality and warning, once an attempt to arrest has been unsuccessful or is not feasible. Similarly, even where international humanitarian law prevails as the lex specialis, international human rights law remains in the background and may require an inquiry whenever a person has been deliberately killed by security forces in a non-combat situation.   See Suarez de Guerrero v. Colombia, paras. 13.1–13.3. 101