CAT/C/29/D/161/2000 page 11 positive obligation to protect the right to life in the context of their above-mentioned duty to prevent and suppress offences against the person … it must be established to its satisfaction that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk ... [H]aving regard to the nature of the right protected by article 2, a right fundamental in the scheme of the Convention, it is sufficient for an applicant to show that the authorities did not do all that could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life of which they have or ought to have knowledge.6 8.11 The complainants further contend that the extent of the obligation to take preventive measures may increase with the immediacy of the risk to life. In support of this argument, they extensively rely on the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey where the Court laid down the obligations of States as follows: first, States have an obligation to take every reasonable step in order to prevent a real and immediate threat to the life and integrity of a person when the actions could be perpetrated by a person or group of persons with the consent or acquiescence of public authorities; second, States have an obligation to provide an effective remedy, including a proper and effective investigation, with regard to actions committed by non-State actors undertaken with the consent or acquiescence of public authorities. 8.12 The complainants also underline that the obligation of the States under the European Convention on Human Rights goes well beyond mere criminal sanctions for private individuals who have committed acts contrary to article 3 of the said Convention. In Z. v. United Kingdom, the European Commission on Human Rights held that the authorities were aware of the serious ill-treatment and neglect suffered by the applicants over a period of years at the hands of their parents and failed, despite the means reasonably available to them, to take any effective steps to bring it to an end ... [The State had therefore] failed in its positive obligation under article 3 of the Convention to provide the applicants with adequate protection against inhuman and degrading treatment.7 8.13 In conclusion, the complainants submit that “they were indeed subjected to acts of community violence inflicting on them great physical and mental suffering amounting to torture and/or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment”. They further state that “this happened for the purpose of punishing them for an act committed by a third person (the rape of S.B.), and that the community violence (or rather the racist pogrom) at issue took place in the presence of, and thus with the ‘consent or acquiescence’ of, the police whose duty under law was precisely the opposite - to secure their safety and afford them protection”. 8.14 Finally, concerning the absence of observations by the State party on the merits, the complainants refer to rule 108 (6) of the Committee’s rules of procedure and consider that such