CAT/C/55/D/571/2013 Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties concerned, in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention. 7.2 The issue before the Committee is whether the forcible removal of the complainant to Afghanistan would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 (1) of the Convention not to expel or to return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 7.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to Afghanistan. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, including the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would return. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be “personally” at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 7.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention, in which it states that the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. Although the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable, the Committee recalls that the burden of proof normally falls upon the complainant, who must present an arguable case establishing that he or she runs a “foreseeable, real and personal” risk. 21 The Committee also recalls that, under the terms of its general comment No. 1, it gives considerable weight to findings of fact made by the organs of the State party concerned, while at the same time, it is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, provided by article 22 (4) of the Convention, to freely assess the facts based on the full set of circumstances in every case. 7.5 The Committee notes that the complainant claims that he had been kidnapped twice by the Taliban in the past, subjected to physical abuse, including of a sexual nature, and that the Taliban had asked him to participate in jihad. He also claimed that he would face a personal and real risk of being subjected to torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment by the Taliban if returned to Afghanistan. The Committee also notes the State party’s submission that the Danish Appeals Board found that complainant had failed to substantiate his grounds for seeking asylum as his statements regarding the kidnappings had been inconsistent and elaborative, that it considered it unlikely that the Taliban would have subjected the complainant to torture and sexual abuse during the entire detention of 22 days if, as he had stated, he had accepted to participate in jihad from the beginning and that the Taliban had nevertheless released the complainant against payment of ransom. 7.6 The Committee notes the complainant’s claims that the State party failed to carry out an independent medical assessment of his allegations of abuse and torture. It also notes the 21 14 See, for example, communications No. 414/2010, N.T.W. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 16 May 2012, para. 7.3; and No. 343/2008, Kalonzo v. Canada, decision adopted on 18 May 2012, para. 9.3.