CEDAW/C/73/D/102/2016 not mean that no wrongdoing has occurred in these cases and that [the sterilization] was lawful”. There is no information that any criminal sanction has been imposed in the cases investigated by the Ombudsperson or those of the authors. State party’s observations on admissibility and the merits 4.1 On 22 September 2016, the State party emphasized that it could neither confirm nor challenge most of the circumstances of the sterilizations of the authors. None of them have initiated domestic proceedings in which evidence could have been gathered and assessed by a court. J.D. and G. had their cases examined to a certain extent by the Ombudsperson and by the police. However, the examinations were conducted long after their sterilizations and the gathering of evidence was challenging. 4.2 According to a medical report dated 1 February 2002, B. was sterilized in 1982. F. stressed that she had been sterilized in 1987 but did not provide supporting evidence, except a 1987 decision by a sterilization committee granting consent to her sterilization upon her request. M. was sterilized in May or June 1987 and enclosed a 1987 decision by a sterilization committee granting consent to her sterilization upon her request. C. enclosed a decision by a sterilization committee granting consent to her sterilization upon her request and medical documentation on her sterilization in February 1989. She claims becoming aware of the full consequences of her sterilization seven years later. G. was sterilized on 24 September 1990 and claims that she became aware of “the full consequences” one day after the surgery. J.D. was sterilized on 27 July 2001 and claims that she became aware of her sterilization when discharged from the hospital, on 2 August 2001. Leaving the hospital, she told her husband that she probably could not have more children. He stated that they took the medical documentation home and that they both understood the meaning of the word “sterilization”. The sterilizations of the last two authors were investigated by the Ombudsperson, 16 who made no mention of bad faith on the part of the medical personnel and/or their intention to ill-treat the authors. 4.3 The State party elaborates on the domestic law (the Civil Code in force from 1 January 1992 to 31 December 2013) and the case law of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court relevant to the interpretation of the application of the right to protection of personal rights and of the general limitation period for claims for compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The State party explains that the limitation period was not applied to such claims until 2008. 17 In 2008, the Supreme Court shifted its legal view, stating: “If the non-pecuniary damage compensation claim includes a claim for the payment of an amount of money, the principle of legal certainty excludes the passing of time without any legal effects.”18 It newly applied the limitation period to claims for compensation for non-pecuniary damage. However, the Constitutional Court interpreted the principle that rights must be exercised in accordance with good morals, which is an important corrective to a potential disproportionate hardship of the limitation period. 19 The Supreme Court quashed judgments of lower courts, __________________ 16 17 18 19 19-15443 “Final report about the outcome of the investigation”, File No. 3104/2004/VOP/PM, 16 January 2006. The Ombudsperson concluded that “there was a breach of law because the principle of informed consent as a basic legal condition for the permissibility of medical intervention was not respected”. Czech Republic, Supreme Court, Case No. 30 Cdo 1542/2003, judgment of 25 September 2003; Case No. 30 1522/2007, judgment of 28 June 2007. Czech Republic, Supreme Court, Case No. 31 Cdo 3161/2008, judgment of 12 November 2008. Czech Republic, Constitutional Court, Case No. II, ÚS 3168/09, judgment of 5 August 2010; Case No. II, ÚS 635/09, judgment of 31 August 2010. 7/18