CEDAW/C/73/D/102/2016 stressing that they had not considered whether the limitation period complied with good morals. 20 4.4 The State party maintains that the scope of the communication does not concern the circumstances of the authors’ sterilizations and is limited to an alleged violation of the right to remedy in the given context. Therefore, the State party focuses on the alleged violation of their right to remedy. 4.5 The State party submits that the communication is insufficiently substantiated for purposes of admissibility and incompatible ratione temporis with the Optional Protocol. There was a considerable delay in the filing of the communication, amounting to an abuse of the right to present a communication. The authors have not exhausted domestic remedies, given that they have not initiated any appropriate domestic legal proceedings. Domestic courts have had only a limited possibility to gather and assess evidence allowing them to objectively ascertain the circumstances of the cases. The possibility of the Committee to examine the case is limited in the absence of case files of domestic authorities and given that the authors themselves presented partial evidence. 21 4.6 The authors should have provided prima facie substantiation of an interference with their rights and an arguable basis for a violation. If they wanted to file a complaint with an international quasi-judicial body, they should have borne a prima facie standard of proof. It seems that B., F. and M. did not meet such a requirement. It is hardly possible to infer the circumstances of their cases from the limited evidence enclosed with their communication when they have not initiated any domestic proceedings. 22 The Committee “does not replace the national authorities in the assessment of the facts”23 and “it is generally for the courts of the States parties to the Convention to evaluate the facts and evidence”.24 4.7 The State party questions whether B., F. and M. “sufficiently substantiated for purposes of admissibility” the circumstances of their sterilizations and the alleged failure of domestic authorities to provide sufficient redress to them. 25 C. presented certain evidence to the Committee, and J.D. and G. had their cases e xamined by the Ombudsperson. The State party accepts that these three authors presented prima facie evidence for the purposes of admissibility. 4.8 The State party recalls the case of A.S. v. Hungary, in which the Committee considered “the facts that are the subject of the communication to be of a continuous nature and that admissibility ratione temporis is thereby justified”.26 The State party submits that in that case, the sterilization was performed less than three months before the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for Hungary and A.S. resorted to relevant domestic remedies shortly thereafter (within a reasonable period of 10 months after the sterilization). 4.9 The State party questions whether the Committee’s conclusion in that case is applicable to the present communication, in which the relevant facts (regarding five authors) occurred long before the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party. The events took place even well before the Optional Protocol entered into __________________ 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 8/18 Czech Republic, Supreme Court, Case No. 30 Cdo 2819/2009, judgment of 23 June 2011; Case No. 30 Cdo 1528/2014, judgment of 22 October 2014. Y.W. v. Denmark (CEDAW/C/60/D/51/2013), para. 8.8. T.N. v. Denmark (CEDAW/C/59/D/37/2012), para. 12.7. R.P.B. v. Philippines (CEDAW/C/57/D/34/2011), para. 7.5. M.S. v. Philippines (CEDAW/C/58/D/30/2011), para. 6.4. N. v. Netherlands (CEDAW/C/57/D/39/2012), paras. 6.7, 6.10 and 6.11; M.S. v. Philippines, para. 6.5; Y.C. v. Denmark (CEDAW/C/59/D/59/2013), para. 6.4. A.S. v. Hungary, para. 10.4. 19-15443