CAT/C/53/D/519/2012 return to his country of origin. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3, paragraph 2, of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of the evaluation is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 9.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3, according to which the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. While the risk does not have to meet the test of being “highly probable”,2 the Committee recalls that the burden of proof generally falls on the complainant, who must present an arguable case that he or she faces a “foreseeable, real and personal” risk.3 While under the terms of its general comment the Committee is free to assess the facts on the basis of the full set of circumstances in every case, it recalls that it is not a judicial or appellate body, and that it must give considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned. 4 9.5 The complainant claims that he will be detained and tortured if he returns to Myanmar, as he was detained without due process after the events in August 1988 and subjected to inhuman treatment while in detention. He also claims that he is still being sought by the Myanmar authorities, as a summons was issued in his name in February 2008. The Committee notes the State party’s submission that, in the present case, the complainant had not provided credible evidence and had failed to substantiate that there was a foreseeable, real and personal risk that he would be subjected to torture by the authorities if he returned to Myanmar, that his claims had been reviewed by the competent domestic authorities in accordance with the domestic legislation, and that the latter were not satisfied that the complainant fell within the categories of persons entitled to protection under the Refugee Convention. 9.6 The Committee is of the view that the complainant has not submitted any objective evidence whatsoever to substantiate that he would be at risk of being subjected to torture by the authorities if returned to Myanmar. It notes that the complainant has submitted only a copy of the summons, dated 28 February 2008; however that document was issued in the name of one P.Z. and not in the name of the complainant. Nor is there any medical evidence in the case file to corroborate the complainant’s account of experiencing illtreatment while in detention in 1988. The Committee also notes that, after the complainant left Myanmar and escaped to Thailand on 25 December 1988, he voluntarily returned to Myanmar in October 1992 and stayed there without experiencing any problems for six months, helping with the family business, before returning to Thailand in April 1993. The Committee further notes that the complainant does not claim that he has participated in any 2 3 4 8 General comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22 (refoulement and communication), para. 6. Ibid. See also communication No. 203/2002, A.R. v. The Netherlands, Views adopted on 14 November 2003, para. 7.3. See, inter alia, communication No. 356/2008, N.S. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 6 May 2010, para. 7.3.