OSCE/ODIHR Opinion on the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Seimas Ombudsmen 6. The Ombudsmen’s Office 64. Chapter IV of the Law describes the Ombudsmen’s Office (Article 24), its structure (Article 25) and head (Article 28). Guarantees of the Ombudsmen’s activities and of related matters are laid down under Chapter V. 65. According to Article 24, the Ombudsmen’s Office is a budgetary institution and an independent state institution, with legal personality. While the stated independence of this institution is welcomed and in line with the financial independence required by the Paris Principles22, the Law is not very specific on how to ensure and safeguard this financial independence. 66. At this point it should be mentioned that financial independence is essential for the very existence and working capacity of an Ombuds institution – without such independence, investigations may be impeded or prevented, work flows may be blocked and the institution’s ability to survive financially may be compromised. The Law would thus benefit from further buttressing Article 24 by stipulating that the Ombudsmen Office is entitled to sufficient state funds to ensure its proper functioning in accordance with the Law, in addition to having its own bank account and seal, as already provided by Article 24. 67. Further, all budgetary processes relevant to the Ombudsmen Office shall be conducted directly between this office and the Seimas – it is paramount that the executive is not involved in this process, given the Ombudsmen’s role as human rights monitor of government activities. As a safeguard to maintain the Ombudsmen Office’s budget at an appropriate level, the Law could stipulate that from one year to the next, the budget of the Ombudsmen Office may only be reduced by a certain percentage. The Law should also provide a clear legal basis for the Ombudsmen Office to receive additional subsidies from external, including international donors. 68. Structurally, the Seimas Ombudsmen Office consists of the Ombudsmen, civil servants and other employees (Article 25). The Office is headed by one of the Ombudsmen, as appointed by the Seimas under Article 28 upon nomination of the Speaker of the Seimas. In case of absence, this Ombudsman shall be replaced by the other elected Ombudsman. 69. As stated earlier (par 17 supra), the practical efficiency of this structure raises certain doubts. Generally, it is questionable whether it is advisable to have two Ombudsmen, but only one head of the Ombudsman Office which, after all, is meant as a support body for both Ombudsmen. With such a structure, the other Ombudsman will only be involved in the running of the office if the actual head of the office is absent, and may then not have the knowledge or experience to adequately replace the head of office. Moreover, Article 25 does not provide for cases where the second Ombudsman is unable or not available to replace the head of office. This could lead to problems in practice with the ultimate negative result of reducing the effectiveness of the institution in dealing with human rights violations. 70. This is another reason why it would be advisable to simplify the structure of the Ombudsmen Office so that there is only one Ombudsman dealing with all cases, both 22 Under the section on “[c]omposition and guarantees of independence and pluralism”, par 2, the Paris Principles stress that a national institution shall have “an infrastructure which is suited to the smooth conduct of its activities, in particular adequate funding. The purpose of this funding should be to enable it to have its own staff and premises, in order to be independent of the Government and not be subject to financial control which might affect its independence” (op.cit note 2). 18