CRPD/C/16/D/7/2012 incarcerate 10 people with a high level of security. The author fears that once the facility is operational, the Review Board will revoke his conditional order and detain him there. 38 5.7 With respect to the State party’s reference to the programmes available to support individuals with cognitive impairments in the criminal justice system, the author submits that no such programmes have been made available to him and that their existence is irrelevant to the human rights violations he alleges. 5.8 As regards the State party’s contentions relating to the law reform, the author notes that the Mentally Impaired Defendants Act 1996 has not been reformed since he submitted his communication. He reiterates that the Act provides for treatment of persons with disabilities that is different from that of other accused persons on the basis of disability, and that his treatment never constituted legitimate differential treatment, but was in fact aggravated illegitimate detrimental treatment. 5.9 The author argues that the State party’s submissions are based on the assumption that he committed the offences with which he was charged, which he did not. It could not be established that he presents a continuing danger to the public, but he has been stigmatized and dealt with as if he did. 5.10 With respect to the State party’s contention that legislation similar to the Mentally Impaired Defendants Act exists in other jurisdictions, the author considers that that does not indicate that such legislation serves a legitimate purpose. Rather, it is one of the most serious and pervasive forms of violation of the rights of persons with disabilities and should be urgently reformed. 5.11 The author submits that following the quashing of his indictment, he applied to the District Court of Western Australia for the determination of his mental fitness. The application was heard by the Court on 4 November 2010 and rejected on 5 November 2010.39 As to the State party’s submission that the author could have appealed the District Court’s decision to the Western Australian Court of Appeal, the author considers that that would have been futile; he would have needed to demonstrate that the District Court’s decision was in error, while it was legally correct under the Mentally Impaired Defendants Act. As to a possible arguable claim for judicial review, it would have been limited to challenging the exercise of the Review Board’s discretion to make recommendations to the Minister of Health or the Governor of Western Australia regarding his release. As they are not required to accept the Review Board’s recommendations, any potential judicial review could not provide the author with an enforceable domestic remedy. 5.12 The author considers that the Mentally Impaired Defendants Act does not impose any obligation on the Court to contemplate the reasonable accommodations that could enable an accused person with an intellectual disability or mental illness to stand trial and receive a fair trial. The author considers that, owing to the failure to accord him fair guarantees as regards the offences with which he was charged in October 2002, he continues to be treated as if he had committed the offences, without giving him the capacity to challenge that assumption. 5.13 In relation to the risk of harm in prison, the author submits that the assaults he faced were serious. He was subjected to frequent acts of violence and abuse from other prisoners, apparently not recorded by prison authorities. Owing to their frequency, the offences made him more vulnerable; his disability prevented him from protecting himself and that situation amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. 38 39 The author refers to the Review Board’s letter to him dated 22 November 2011, which states that “the Board considers that placement in a declared place is a more appropriate accommodation option for you in view of your needs and considering the risk factors”. See The State of Western Australia v. Noble, No. 2 (2010), District Court of Western Australia. 11