CRPD/C/16/D/7/2012 some of the events that occurred before the entry into force of the Optional Protocol fall within the competence of the Committee insofar as they constitute a continuing violation. The Committee recalls that under article 2 (f) of the Optional Protocol, the Committee shall consider a communication inadmissible when “the facts that are the subject of the communication occurred prior to the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party concerned unless those facts continued after that date”. The Committee also recalls that a continuing violation is to be interpreted as an affirmation, after the entry into force of the Optional Protocol, by act or by clear implication, of the previous violations. 41 7.5 In the present case, the Optional Protocol entered into force for the State party on 19 September 2009. The Committee notes that the author was first detained in October 2001 on charges of sexual assault. From 2002, the author was maintained in custody during the assessment of his intellectual impairment, which lasted until March 2003, when the District Court of Western Australia found that the author was unfit to plead and was made subject to a custody order. After that date and until January 2012, the author remained detained. The author’s detention therefore clearly continued after the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party, and the author’s claim under article 14 (1) (b) is within the Committee’s competence ratione temporis. 7.6 As regards the Committee’s competence ratione temporis to examine the author’s allegations under articles 12 and 13 in relation to the consequences of the declaration that the author was unfit to plead, the Committee notes that the District Court of Western Australia first adopted that decision in March 2003. The Committee also notes that the decision was reiterated de facto by the authorities of the State party, including through the decision of the District Court of Western Australia of 5 November 2010; while the Court dismissed the application of the author’s legal representative for an order that he was fit to plead not on the merits, but on lacking jurisdiction, it left no option for the author to exercise his legal capacity before the courts. The author therefore continued to be deprived of the opportunity to plead not guilty and to have the evidence against him tested after the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party. In view thereof, the Committee concludes that it is competent ratione temporis to consider this part of the communication. 7.7 Secondly, the Committee notes the State party’s arguments relating to the lack of exhaustion of domestic remedies. In this regard, the Committee first notes that according to the State party, the author’s allegations relating to the fact that he was not able to exercise his legal capacity (art. 12 (2) and (3)) and that he did not have access to justice (art. 13 (1)) should be considered inadmissible because the author could have appealed the District Court’s decision of 5 November 2010 to the Western Australian Court of Appeal, but did not do so. The Committee also notes the author’s argument that for his appeal to have any chance of success, he would have had to demonstrate that the District Court’s decision was in error, while in fact it was adopted in compliance with the Mentally Impaired Defendants Act. The Committee recalls that domestic remedies need not be exhausted if they objectively have no prospect of success. 42 Taking into account the clear wording of the relevant sections of the Act, the Committee concludes that no additional effective remedies were available to the author and that his claims under articles 12 (2) and (3) and 13 (1) are admissible under article 2 (d) of the Optional Protocol. 7.8 The Committee then notes the State party’s argument that the author’s claim under article 14 (2) relating to his conditions of detention should be considered inadmissible insofar as he failed to exhaust domestic remedies that could have resulted in an alteration of the conditions to which he objects. The Committee also notes that the author does not 41 42 See Könye and Könye v. Hungary, para. 6.4. See Human Rights Committee, communication No. 941/2000, Young v. Australia, Views adopted on 6 August 2003, para. 9.4. 13