Jackie Jones, Jeanne Sarson, and Linda MacDonald 37 in the private sphere for Canadian women. It is impossible for Canadian women to seek justice for non-State torture crimes because such a criminal offence does not exist in Canada’s Criminal Code, and Canada does not currently fulfil its international law obligations. These obligations include rec­ ognising the prevention of torture as a jus cogens norm of international law and part of customary international law. Additionally, since the Vienna Declaration of 1993, there is an increasing movement towards treating gender inequality as a violation of customary international law. Furthermore, from a non-State-centric due diligence obligation, Ertürk (2006) has concluded, based on State practices and opinio juris, that “there is a rule of customary international law that obligates States to prevent and respond to acts of violence with due diligence” (para. 29). Ertürk made reference to the Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras decision, which stated that “the act of a private person . . . can lead to international responsibility of the State . . . because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the [American Convention on Human Rights]” (1988, para. 172; see also Edwards, 2011, pp. 237-252). Likewise, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights made a similar ruling in the case of Maria Da Penha v. Brazil (2001). Moreover, the Court in Velásquez held that a State will be liable when “a violation of . . . rights . . . has occurred with the support or the acquiescence of the Government, [or when] the State has allowed the act to take place without taking measures to prevent it or to punish those responsible” (para 173; see also Godinez Cruz v. Honduras). The State’s due diligence fail­ ure was also identified in the case of Opuz v. Turkey, under Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), which states that “no one shall be subjected to torture.” The case also explained that States parties are required “to take measures . . . to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to tor­ ture . . . by private individuals (2009, para. 159). Interights (International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights) submitted to this case that “the jus cogens nature of the right to freedom from torture . . . required exemplary diligence on the part of the State with respect to investigation and prosecution of these acts” (para. 125; see Askin, 1997, pp. 239-242; Romany, 1994, pp. 99-102). Furthermore, in Jessica Gonzales v. United States, the United States appearing before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was asked about its affirmative obli­ gations to protect individuals from private acts of violence (Bettinger-Lόpez, 2008). In all of these cases, the violence was perpetrated by men—by non-State actors—against women within the family context. The Committee against Torture is entrusted with supervising how States enact and implement the UNCAT to promote protection from torture and other inhuman acts globally (Centre for Human Rights, 2009). Looking through a feminist lens, the non-derogable human right of women not to be subjected to torture was negated by discriminatory language employed during the drafting of the UNCAT. Operationalized historically through the patriarchal dominant perspective (Mendez, 2016), he, him, and his are mentioned 21 times—she is absent. Men needed protection from tortur­ ing each other during war—she didn’t matter. That she was tortured during war and at home did not matter (Askin, 1997; Brownmiller, 1990; Copelon, 2009; Edwards, 2011; Fortin, 2008; Randall, 2006). But she would not be silenced. Gaer (1998) wrote that building on centuries of efforts, the 1995 United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing advanced women’s rights as human rights, and part of international human rights. It took the Committee against Torture (2008) over twenty years before it released its General Comment No. 2, stating that the UNCAT applied to violence perpetrated against women by nonState actors that met the defining elements of torture as described in Article 1 of the Convention.