68 GENDER PERSPECTIVES ON TORTURE: Law and Practice The Committee also analyzed Communication No. 279/2005 in the case of C. T. and K. M. v. Sweden, presented by a Rwandan citizen and her minor child. In this case, the complainant was detained in Rwanda for belonging to a particular political party. While she was in detention, the authorities raped her repeatedly and threatened to kill her, and she became pregnant as a result of the rapes. Upon arrival in Sweden, she applied for asylum. When her application was denied, she faced deportation back to Rwanda. In its decision, the Committee determined that she “was repeat­ edly raped in detention and as such was subjected to torture in the past”68 and her deportation was improper and a breach of Article 3. In 2010, in two similar cases, the Committee considered that being deported to a country where sexual violence occurs, would amount to a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. In Njamba and Balikosa v. Sweden, the complainants, two Congolese women, fled to Sweden from DRC after the murder of their family, where they were denied asylum. They claimed that if they were returned to DRC, they would be subject to torture, rape and sexual exploitation by security forces. In its decision, the Committee put a special emphasis on the scale of violence against women in the region—especially sexual violence, which “makes it impossible for the Committee to identify par­ ticular areas of the country which could be considered safe for the complainants in their current and evolving situation69”. The Committee found that there was substantial ground to believe that the complainants were in danger of being subjected to sexual violence amounting to torture if returned to DRC.70 Also, in Bakatu-Bia v. Sweden, a Congolese woman was arrested because of her religious and political activities. While in detention, she was subjected to torture, beatings and mul­ tiple rapes by security forces. She claimed that she would be imprisoned and tortured if returned to the Democratic Republic of Congo by Sweden, in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. The Committee found that she was indeed at risk of being subjected to torture if returned to her country and that Sweden would be in breach of Article 3 if it did so. 71 The above judgments and jurisprudence represent clear progress toward the inclusion of a gen­ der perspective in the definition of torture. Rape was first recognized as a form of torture when committed by State agents in State facilities such as prisons. The language of the Convention against Torture, “with the consent or acquiescence of”72, was initially construed very narrowly to mean that the person committing the torture must be a State official. The definition of torture and degrading and inhuman treatment was later broadened to include sexual violence committed by private persons and acts committed in private spaces. Nonetheless, it has proven difficult to estab­ lish that acts committed in private spaces constitute torture, and they have tended to be considered degrading and inhuman treatment. In any case, it has been clearly established that sexual violence and gender-based violence are particularly egregious forms of torture that have been used by State agents in order to inflict harm or severe physical or mental suffering on victims.73 court-rulings-database/v-l-v-switzerland-communication-no-262-2005. 68 Case C.T. and K.M. v. Sweden, Communication No. 279/2005. Committee against Torture, November 17, 2006, para. 7.5. 69 Case Eveline Njamba and Kathy Balikosa v. Sweden, Communication No. 322/2007, Committee against Torture, June 3, 2010, para. 9.5 70 Ibid. 71 CAT, Sylvie Bakatu-Bia v. Sweden, Communication No. 379/2009, June 3, 2011. 72 Convention against Torture, at art. 1. 73 Aydin v Turkey, op. cit., para. 251; Akayesu, op. cit.; C.T. and K.M. v. Sweden, 279/2005, 17 November 2006; V.L. v. Switzerland, 262/2005, 27 January 2007; Prosecutor v. Kvocka Case No. IT-98-30/1; Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison, op. cit.