CCPR/C/132/D/3105/2018 7.2 The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 7.3 The Committee notes the State party’s contention that the author’s son failed to exhaust all domestic remedies available to him by not filing himself a supervisory review request with the Prosecutor General and the Supreme Court. The Committee observes that counsel for the author’s son filed a number of such requests, all of which were rejected (para. 4.2). The Committee recalls its jurisprudence according to which a petition for supervisory review to a prosecutor’s office, dependent on the discretionary power of the prosecutor, against a judgment having the force of res judicata does not constitute an effective remedy that has to be exhausted for the purposes of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol. 7 It also considers that filing requests for supervisory review with the president of a court directed against court decisions that have entered into force and depend on the discretionary power of a judge constitutes an extraordinary remedy and that the State party must show that there is a reasonable prospect that such requests would provide an effective remedy in the circumstances of the case.8 In the case at hand, the State party has not shown, however, whether and in how many cases the petition to the president of the Supreme Court for supervisory review procedures were applied successfully in cases concerning the right to a fair trial. In such circumstances, and with regard to the supervisory review procedures, the Committee finds that article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol does not preclude it from considering the communication.9 7.4 With regard to the requirements laid down in article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol, the Committee also takes note of the State party’s argument that the author had not exhausted all domestic remedies at the time of submission of the communication, in particular in view of the fact that his application for a presidential pardon was still pending. In this regard, and in the light of the information regarding the execution of the author’s son, the Committee reiterates its previous jurisprudence, according to which the presidential pardon is an extraordinary and extrajudicial remedy,10 and as such does not constitute an effective remedy for the purposes of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol. Furthermore, in the present case, the pardon could not have constituted on its own a sufficient remedy for the violations alleged. Therefore, the Committee considers that, with regard to the presidential pardon, it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from considering the communication. 7.5 The Committee has noted the author’s claims under articles 7 and 14 (1) and (3) (g) of the Covenant. In the absence of any further pertinent information on file, and due to the general nature of the claims brought forward by the author, however, the Committee considers that the author has failed to sufficiently substantiate these allegations for the purposes of admissibility. Accordingly, it declares this part of the communication inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 7.6 The Committee has also noted the author’s allegations that the State party violated his son’s rights under articles 9 (1)–(2) and (4) and 14 (3) (a)–(b) and (d) of the Covenant. In the absence of further information, however, the Committee is unable to establish whether domestic remedies have been exhausted with regard to these particular claims and therefore considers that it is precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from considering this part of the communication. 7.7 The Committee considers that the author’s remaining claims, raising issues under articles 6 (1)–(2), 9 (3) and 14 (2) and (3) (e) of the Covenant, have been sufficiently 7 8 9 10 6 Alekseev v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/109/D/1873/2009), para. 8.4. Gelazauskas v. Lithuania (CCPR/C/77/D/836/1998), para. 7.4; Sekerko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/109/D/1851/2008), para. 8.3; Protsko and Tolchin v. Belarus (CCPR/C/109/D/19191920/2009), para. 6.5; Schumilin v. Belarus (CCPR/C/105/D/1784/2008), para. 8.3; and P.L. v. Belarus (CCPR/C/102/D/1814/2008), para. 6.2. See, inter alia, Kostenko v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/115/D/2141/2012), para. 6.3; and Dorofeev v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/111/D/2041/2011), para. 9.6. Singarasa v. Sri Lanka (CCPR/C/81/D/1033/2001), para. 6.4; Chisanga v. Zambia (CCPR/C/85/D/1132/2002), para. 6.3; Kovaleva and Kozyar v. Belarus, para. 10.4; and Selyun v. Belarus (CCPR/C/115/D/2289/2013), para. 6.3.