uL stration and eV tting in post-communist Albania inter-linked with civic trust in governmental institutions LUSTRATION AND VETTING LINKED WITH CIVIC TRUST IN GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS UNDP guidelines on vetting public employees (2006) considers transparency important “to reestablish civic and re-legitimize public institutions, the public needs to be aware of and trust the reform process itself. Transparency about the vetting process and consultation about its objectives will help in building confidence in the process, in reducing uncertainty experienced by the personnel subject to the process, and in ensuring that it effectively responds to the actual needs of victims and society in general”56. The implementation of Genocide Laws and Verification law were not transparent putting in doubt to reestablish civic trust. The laws were set in that way that the executive power could control their implementation. As the report on Human Rights Practices of U.S Department of States (1996) affirms: “the executive branch effectively controlled the Commission and gave it the powers to judge, in closed session, decisions based on secret files that were not open for review to the general public, but that were available to the candidates and their lawyers for examination. The executive branch also had the final say in the decisions; the Prime Minister, Minister of Interior, and the head of SHIK had the right to appear before the Commission and take part in the decision in any case on the basis of state security interests”57. The Verification Commision was so partiall and not objective not giving the right time the parties under investigation to prepere a defense and to appeal in to a independent court. The civil society in Albania was weak during 1995-1996 and their influence in shaping civic-trust remains low. Lustration and vetting process during 1995-1996 was elite focused, excluding the public and undermining civic trust in governmental institutions. About the discussion of lustration measures in post-communist Albania, Elez Biberaj explains: “Political forces on the right were unanimously in favor of opening all files. Others were more circumspect, demanding only disclosure only for politicians. Some insisted that the files be opened also for writers, artists, and journalists. Berisha maintained that probing to deeply into the Sigurimi would result in a national tragedy. While rejecting demands for the opening of all secret police file, the president agreed that files should be opened for all elected officials and politicians. But in addition to Berisha’s argument that opening the file would cause undue social problems, an additional contributing factor in his delaying action might have been the fact that there were a number of former Sigurimi agents and informers in the top echelons of the Democratic Party and among parliamentary deputies. While refusing to disclose the names of the former collaborators and informers in the ranks of the ruling party, government officials leaked the names of the opposition politicians and journalists who had links with the secret police. Among the politicians named were Preç Zogaj, a top leader of the Democratic Alliance, and Skender Gjinushi, chairman of the Social Democratic Party”58. The lustration and vetting process was controlled by the party in power. Making the process partially and implemented not by independent institutions. The US Department of State in the report on Human Rights practices in Albania considered the year 1996 a backward for human right and democracy in Albania. Stated that: “The Government’s human rights record worsened during the year. The flawed May elections, coming at a time of further government pressure on the judiciary and the press were major steps backwards for democracy. There were numerous serious human rights abuses during the May 26, 1996 parliamentary elections and the May 28 opposition demonstration in protest of those elections. Other serious problems included police killings and beatings; poor prison and pretrial detention conditions; harassment of the press; a judiciary that is subject to widespread corruption and executive pressure and lacking in resources, training, and experience; and discrimination and 56. “Vetting public employees in post-conflict settings” Operational Guidelines, UNDP, Publication II, New York 2006 57. U.S. Department of State Albania Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 58. Biberaj, Elez, pg 180-181 135