CAT/OP/HUN/2 preventive mechanism members, for example, by wearing badges or vests, and should provide information leaflets to the authorities and the detainees. 46. Confidentiality and risk of reprisals: The Subcommittee reiterates that the location where individual interviews take place should be carefully chosen to ensure that the contents of the interview remain confidential and that the “do no harm” principle is applied, without exception. The interviewers should indicate that the interviewees can report any reprisals they may face subsequent to the visit and encourage them to do so. If necessary, follow-up visits should be conducted. The Subcommittee underlines the need to always seek ways to protect those interviewed from possible reprisals, even where there appears to be little risk. The Subcommittee noted that, at the final debriefing at the end of the joint visit, the mechanism members did not inform the authorities of the place of detention concerned that any form of intimidation or reprisal against persons deprived of their liberty constituted a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 13 of the Convention against Torture and article 20 of the Optional Protocol. 47. The Subcommittee recommends that the national preventive mechanism always consider that detainees interviewed during visits face a risk of intimidation, sanctions or reprisals, and therefore take steps to address that risk. In addition to taking the above-mentioned precautions, the mechanism should clearly inform the authorities that reprisals of any kind are unacceptable, will be reported and will be followed up by the mechanism. This should be done with the clear intention of ensuring that those responsible for such reprisals are promptly investigated and, if found guilty, appropriately sanctioned. The mechanism should also, inter alia, undertake preventive follow-up visits. 3. Visibility and awareness 48. The Subcommittee observed that the national preventive mechanism lacked visibility among the authorities and among persons deprived of their liberty, a situation that may have a detrimental effect on the mechanism’s efficiency and effectiveness. In many places of deprivation of liberty, neither the administration nor the detainees were aware of the mechanism, its role or its function. Moreover, the Subcommittee concluded that some officials in places of deprivation of liberty were not familiar with the recommendations made by the mechanism following visits to their facilities. 49. The Subcommittee recommends increasing the visibility of the national preventive mechanism, including through activities that raise awareness of the Optional Protocol and of the mechanism’s mandate. The mechanism should undertake activities to increase the awareness of the general public, and, in particular, persons deprived of their liberty, of its mission and its mandate. In line with article 19 of the Optional Protocol, the mechanism should engage in legislative processes and advocacy, in order to increase its overall visibility. The Subcommittee also recommends that the mechanism engage in outreach activities and other events, as appropriate. 50. The Subcommittee further recommends preparing and distributing additional materials on the national preventive mechanism’s mandate and activities to staff and detainees in places of deprivation of liberty and to wider civil society, in order to increase the mechanism’s visibility and improve understanding of its mandate. IV. Final recommendations 51. In conclusion, the Subcommittee is aware that the national preventive mechanism of Hungary faces complex challenges regarding its legal, institutional and structural framework. It recommends that the mechanism adopt a proactive approach and submit the following elements to the authorities: a proposal concerning the revision of the mechanism’s legal, institutional and structural framework, including within the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights; and proposals concerning ways of securing the necessary financial resources, further to a 9