CCPR/C/120/D/2256/2013 admissible under the Optional Protocol. In the absence of a response by the State party, due weight should be given to the allegations of the author. 6.2 The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 6.3 The Committee takes note of the author’s claim that she has exhausted all effective domestic remedies, as required under article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol, insofar as her application for a remedy, which had already been delayed for 11 years at the time of submission of the author’s initial communication, constitutes an “unreasonably prolonged delay”.15 Firstly, the Committee notes that the alleged perpetrators were identified early on, and the case did not involve complex factual or legal issues that could justify such a delay. Secondly, it notes that the author was not responsible for the delays and did not have access to any domestic recourse to expedite the criminal or civil proceedings. Thirdly, the Committee notes that it took more than five years for the authorities to file (in 2006) the first indictment against the alleged offenders and that, as at the time of submission of the initial communication, the case had been delayed a further seven years amid a series of adjournments. Concerning the civil claim, it has been pending for eight years before the District Court. Additionally, the Committee notes a likelihood of further delay in the domestic proceedings, since the criminal and civil proceedings were at first instance at the time of submission of the initial communication. 16 The Committee recalls that, as highlighted in its previous jurisprudence, proceedings before the superior courts in Sri Lanka, such as the Court of Appeal, have been prolonged.17 The Committee further recalls its jurisprudence to the effect that a remedy that has no chance of being successful cannot count as such and does not need to be exhausted for the purposes of the Optional Protocol.18 However, it notes that the perpetrators were finally convicted and sentenced in December 2015, some 14 years after the submission of the author’s complaint to the police. Since the State party has not contested the admissibility of any of the author’s claims, the Committee considers that due weight must be given to her contentions that the domestic remedies have been unduly prolonged in the circumstances of this case. Consequently, the Committee considers that the requirements of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol have been met. 6.4 The Committee notes the author’s claims that her rape was of a sufficient severity to constitute torture, and that the State party violated her rights by failing to provide accessible and effective remedies to vindicate her right not to be subjected to torture. The Committee also notes that the author presented medical records as evidence of the rape that resulted in her suffering physical and mental pain. It further notes the author’s allegations that the pain and suffering she has faced are attributable to the Sri Lankan authorities because the authorities failed to prevent gender-based violence, to investigate and prosecute those violations successfully and to provide the author with any kind of support or remedy. The author further alleges that the State party has failed to protect her during the proceedings because (a) it has not provided her with an official interpreter, (b) judges failed to acknowledge her vulnerability as a minor member of an ethnic minority, (c) one of the judges acquiesced to manifestly unfounded claims that she was a professional prostitute and 15 16 17 18 For the criteria for what constitutes an “unreasonably prolonged delay”, see Gunaratna v. Sri Lanka, para. 7.5. See, for example, communication No. 747/1997, Des Fours Walderode and Kammerlander v. Czech Republic, Views adopted on 30 October 2001, para. 6.4, with respect to the likelihood of a further delay. See also paragraph 5.2 of communication No. 336/1988, Fillastre and Bizouarn v. Bolivia, Views adopted on 5 November 1991, in which the Committee determined that a delay of over three years of adjudication at first instance, discounting the availability of subsequent appeals, was unreasonably prolonged within the meaning of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol. See, for example, communication No. 1250/2004, Rajapakse v. Sri Lanka, Views adopted on 14 July 2006, para. 9.4, and Gunaratna v. Sri Lanka, para. 7.5. See, for example, communications No. 701/1996, Gómez Vázquez v. Spain, Views adopted on 20 July 2000, para. 6.2., and No. 1153/2003, K.N.L.H. v. Peru, Views adopted on 24 October 2005, para. 5.2. See also L.N.P. v. Argentina, para. 12.3. 5