CCPR/C/120/D/2256/2013 Committee notes the author’s claim that the 14 years that passed between the rape and the conviction constitute an unreasonably prolonged delay in the investigation of her complaint and the criminal prosecution of the suspects. The author’s civil suit against the perpetrators has also been unreasonably delayed. 7.4 The Committee reiterates its jurisprudence that the Covenant does not provide a right for individuals to require that the State party criminally prosecute another person.20 It considers, nonetheless, that the State party is under a duty to investigate promptly, impartially and thoroughly alleged violations of human rights, to prosecute the suspects and punish those held responsible for such violations21 and to provide other forms of reparation, including compensation. 22 The Committee has also recognized the obligation to punish violations by both State and non-State actors.23 Under article 2 (3) of the Covenant, the State party has an obligation to ensure that remedies are effective. Expedition and effectiveness are particularly important in the adjudication of cases involving claims of such gravity as rape. The Committee considers that the State party may not avoid its responsibilities under the Covenant by pointing to the fact that the domestic courts have already dealt or are still dealing with the matter, when it is clear that the remedies granted or pending in the State party have been unduly prolonged and would appear to be ineffective. Regarding the author’s allegations concerning the physical and mental suffering that she endured as a consequence of rape and the State party’s failure to protect her against or adequately respond to rape, the Committee considers that the lack of effective investigation, the unduly prolonged prosecution of the suspects and the punishment of those held responsible only 14 years on, without adequate reparation, as well as the author’s treatment during the court proceedings, when derogatory statements were made against her, contributed to the author’s re-victimization, which was aggravated by the fact that she was a minor when she was raped. The Committee recalls that, as pointed out in paragraph 5 of its general comment No. 20 and its jurisprudence, the right protected under article 7 of the Covenant covers not only physical pain but also mental suffering.24 In the circumstances of the present case, the Committee concludes that the author was the victim of treatment that is in breach of article 7, read alone and in conjunction with article 2 (3), of the Covenant.25 7.5 As to the author’s claim of discrimination under article 26 of the Covenant on the grounds of sex (gender), language and ethnicity, the Committee refers to its long-standing jurisprudence that a differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination unless the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant. In the present case, the author has claimed that she was targeted as a teenaged girl from the most marginalized and impoverished ethnic group in Sri Lanka and that during the investigation of her complaint of rape, the police failed to provide any official interpretation or translation from Tamil to Sinhalese while recording the author’s statement, and that she had to make her statement through an unofficial interpreter translating into Sinhala, even though Tamil is an official language of Sri Lanka. The Committee also notes the author’s claim that she was not afforded the protection she needed as a woman of Tamil ethnicity, and that judges failed to acknowledge her vulnerability as a minor member of an ethnic minority and to intervene to stop the humiliating treatment of the author, in particular when the defence counsel publicly and repeatedly called her a “professional prostitute”. The author has considered this as an attack 20 21 22 23 24 25 See, for example, communications No. 213/1986, H.C.M.A. v. Netherlands, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 30 March 1989, para. 11.6; No. 275/1988, S.E. v. Argentina, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 26 March 1990, para. 5.5; Nos. 343-345/1988, R.A.V.N. et al. v. Argentina, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 26 March 1990, para. 5.5; and Rajapakse v. Sri Lanka, para. 9.3. See Rajapakse v. Sri Lanka, para. 9.3. See, for example, communications No. 1589/2007, Gapirjanov v. Uzbekistan, Views adopted on 18 March 2010, para. 10, and No. 1862/2009, Peiris et al. v. Sri Lanka, Views adopted on 26 October 2011, para. 9. See the Committee’s general comment No. 20, para. 13. See, for example, K.N.L.H. v. Peru, para. 6.3, and communication No. 1608/2007, L.M.R. v. Argentina, Views adopted on 29 March 2011, para. 9.2. See, for example, communication No. 1956/2010, Durić and Durić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Views adopted on 16 July 2014, para. 9.6. See also the Committee’s general comment No. 20, para. 2. 7