CAT/C/58/D/599/2014 The complaint 3. The complainant claims that he will be arrested and detained under the Sri Lanka Immigrants and Emigrants Act upon return to Sri Lanka. He claims that he will be held in remand at Negombo Prison and face a real risk of significant harm consisting of prolonged detention, interrogation and torture, because his brother was an LTTE member and the complainant has had contact with Tamil Congress members in Australia. In addition, the conditions of detention at Negombo Prison constitute degrading treatment. State party’s observations on admissibility and the merits 4.1 On 7 November 2014, the State party submitted its observations on admissibility and the merits, in which it recalled that article 3 provided that States parties had an obligation not to return a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 1 It also recalled that, in its views concerning G.R.B. v Sweden, the Committee had confirmed that the obligation under article 3 was directly linked to the definition of torture set out in article 1 of the Convention.2 The Committee has also noted that several elements must exist for an act to constitute torture: the act must cause a person severe pain or suffering, which may be mental or physical; the act must be intentionally inflicted on a person or on a third person for the purposes of obtaining information, extracting a confession, punishment for an act that the person or a third person allegedly committed, intimidation or coercion, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind; and the act must be inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 3 4.2 The State party notes that each case must be assessed according to its own facts. Whether conduct amounts to torture will depend on the nature of the alleged act. Furthermore, if it is established that the alleged acts constitute torture, article 3 of the Convention also requires that there must be substantial grounds for believing that an individual would be in danger of being subjected to torture, that is, at a foreseeable, real and personal risk of being subjected to torture.4 The Committee has also stated that the danger must be personal and present. 5 In order to show that a State party would be in breach of its non-refoulement obligations under article 3 of the Convention, an individual must be personally at risk of such treatment should he or she be returned to a country. In addition, the onus of proving that there is a foreseeable, real and personal risk of being subjected to torture upon extradition or deportation rests on the complainant. The Committee has also stated that the risk must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory and suspicion. 6 4.3 In the light of the above, the State party submits that the complainant’s claims are inadmissible pursuant to rule 113 (b) of the Committee’s rules of procedures on the grounds that they are manifestly unfounded. In its general comment No. 1, the Committee stated that it is the responsibility of the complainant to establish a prima facie case that there is a foreseeable, real and personal risk that he would be subjected to torture by the authorities of 1 2 3 4 5 6 See, for example, communication No. 39/1996, Paez v. Sweden, Views adopted on 28 April 1997, para. 14.5. See communication No. 83/1997, G.R.B. v. Sweden, Views adopted on 15 May 1998, para. 6.5; also the Committee’s general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, para. 4. See G.R.B. v. Sweden, para. 6.5. See communication No. 203/2002, A.R. v. Netherlands, decision adopted on 14 November 2003, para. 7.3. Ibid.; and the Committee’s general comment No. 1, para. 7. See the Committee’s general comment No. 1, paras. 6-7. 3