46 SAUNDERS v. UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MARTENS, JOINED BY JUDGE KURIS used in evidence against him, although it was obtained as a result of the legislature’s setting aside the privilege against self-incrimination. Why, then, should it per se be inadmissible to use in evidence statements obtained as a result of a similar setting aside both of the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination? As far as the rationale for these immunities is to provide the accused with protection against improper compulsion by the authorities and, thereby, to contribute to avoiding miscarriages of justice, their rationale does not require to hold that subsection (5) of section 434 of the 1985 Act is inadmissible per se: the impartiality of the DTI inspectors who merely seek to establish the truth, their professional qualities - generally speaking senior barristers and accountants -, the procedure before them, based as it is on natural justice under control of the courts, and, finally, the circumstance that those under investigation are given advance notice in writing of what is required of them and may be accompanied by their lawyers22, seem to offer sufficient guarantees against improper physical or psychological pressure, whilst the power of the trial judge under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE)23 constitutes a further guarantee against unfairness arising from the inquisitorial nature of their inquiry as well as against any residual danger of miscarriage of justice. Nor does the argument as to "human dignity and autonomy" compel one to conclude that the use in evidence of the answers given in the inquiry is per se inadmissible. As I have already indicated, this rationale is also to be relativised (see paragraph 10 above) and there is special justification for doing so in the present context. After all, under the hypothesis we are discussing, the answers are "incriminating" (see paragraph 21 above). That means that they to a certain extent disclose both the offence and its perpetrator. The question therefore comes down to asking whether that disclosure may be used when trying to bring that perpetrator to justice. Would it not be stretching the respect for his human dignity and autonomy or, in the terminology of the Court, the respect for his will - too far to hold that the mere fact that he has made these "disclosing" statements in the context of an inquiry during which he enjoyed neither immunity necessarily results in making any and all use of such answers in evidence against him inadmissible per se? I think that this question should at any rate be answered in the affirmative as making any and all use of such answers in evidence inadmissible per se would imply that there is a good chance that - although to a certain extent it had already been disclosed that he was the perpetrator - he would 22 23 See paragraphs 42 and 43 of the Court's judgment. See paragraph of the Court's judgment.