CAT/C/30/D/219/2002 page 9 procedure of international investigation or settlement. In the present case, the Committee also notes that all domestic remedies have been exhausted and that the State party has not objected to the admissibility of the communication. It therefore considers that the communication is admissible and proceeds to the examination of the merits of the case. 6.2 With regard to the complainant’s claim under article 3, paragraph 1, of the Convention, the Committee must determine whether the author’s deportation to Spain violated the State party’s obligation, under that article, not to expel or return a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. In doing so, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations with a view to determining whether the person concerned is in personal danger, including the existence, in the State concerned, of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. 6.3 The Committee recalls that during the consideration of the fourth periodic report submitted by Spain under article 19 of the Convention, it noted with concern the dichotomy between the assertion of the Spanish Government that, isolated cases apart, torture and ill-treatment do not occur in Spain and the information received from non-governmental sources which is said to reveal instances of torture and ill-treatment by the State security and police forces.14 It also expressed concern about the fact that incommunicado detention up to a maximum of five days has been maintained for specific categories of particularly serious offences, given that during this period, the detainee has no access to a lawyer or to a doctor of his choice, nor is he able to contact his family.15 The Committee considered that the incommunicado regime facilitates the commission of acts of torture and ill-treatment.16 6.4 Notwithstanding the above, the Committee reiterates that its primary task is to determine whether the individual concerned would personally risk torture in the country to which he or she would return. It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining that the particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights does not mean that a person cannot be considered to be in danger of being subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 6.5 As to the complainant’s personal risk of being subjected to torture following extradition to Spain, the Committee has noted the complainant’s arguments that the Spanish extradition request was based on false accusations, that, as an ETA suspect, she was at a personal risk of being tortured during incommunicado detention, in the absence of access to a lawyer of her choice during that time, that other persons had been subjected to torture in circumstances that she considers to be similar to her case, and that diplomatic protection by Germany as well as the prior designation of a lawyer constituted protection against possible abuse during incommunicado detention in theory only. It has equally noted the State party’s submission that, in addition to the above-mentioned protection, the international attention drawn to the complainant’s case, as well as the possibility for her to challenge torture or ill-treatment by the Spanish authorities before the Committee and other international instances, constitute further guarantees preventing Spanish police from subjecting her to such treatment.