CCPR/C/127/D/2912/2016 who were killed might still be considered guilty of some serious crimes deserving the capital penalty. The right to seek and receive information was auxiliary to the proceedings on the discontinuation of the Katyn investigation, access to the Katyn case file and to the decision to discontinue the investigation. Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 6.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol. 6.2 As required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, the Committee has ascertained that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 6.3 The Committee notes the State party’s claim that the claim under article 2 (3), read in conjunction with article 6 of the Covenant, is inadmissible ratione temporis. It also notes the authors’ assertion that the violation of their rights continues, insofar as the State party has failed to carry out an effective investigation into the killing of their relatives and that the claim is therefore admissible. The Committee recalls that it is precluded ratione temporis from examining alleged violations that occurred prior to the entry into force of the Covenant for the State party, unless those violations continued after the Covenant and the Optional Protocol became effective for the State party. 4 6.4 The Committee notes that, in the present case, the authors’ claim about a continuing violation stems from the killing of their relatives in 1940, a date which precedes by 36 years the entry into force of the Covenant for the State party (23 March 1976). While the Committee notes that article 2 (3), which has been invoked by the authors in conjunction with article 6 of the Covenant, may give rise in certain circumstances to a continuing obligation to investigate violations that occurred before the entry into force of the Covenant, such a procedural obligation derives from the substantive obligation under article 6 of the Covenant. It can therefore only be applied if the status of the alleged victim as also a victim of a possible violation of article 6 has been prima facie established or acknowledged.5 6.5 The Committee notes that the events underlying the alleged violation of article 6 with respect to the authors’ relatives occurred in 1940, 36 years before the entry into force of the Covenant for the State party and 52 years before the entry into force of the Optional Protocol. The obligation under article 6, read in conjunction with article 2 (3), similarly did not exist before 1976 and could not have been the subject of individual communication proceedings before 1992. In view of the significant passage of time since the events of 1940 and the absence of a formal acknowledgment by the State party of the violation of the rights of the authors’ relatives in the interim, the Committee cannot conclude that in 1992, after the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party, it still had a continuous obligation to investigate the 1940 killings. 6 The Committee notes in this regard the position of the State party that its domestic courts found that the evidence was insufficient to conclude that the authors’ relatives were among those who died as a result of abuse of power by NKVD officials, and the court statement that even the fate of W.W., who was initially identified as a victim, was not confirmed by the final investigation. In the light of these observations, the Committee finds itself precluded ratione temporis from examining the authors’ claim of lack of effective investigation into the killing of their relatives under article 2 (3), read in conjunction with article 6 of the Covenant. 6.6 The Committee notes the authors’ claim that the way they were treated by the authorities of the State party and their refusal to rehabilitate the relatives who had been 4 5 6 8 See the Committee’s general comment No. 33 (2008) on the obligations of States parties under the Optional Protocol, para. 9; Lovelace v. Canada (CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977), para. 10; Simunek and others v. Czech Republic (CCPR/C/54/D/516/1992), para. 4.5; and E. and A.K. v. Hungary (CCPR/C/50/D/520/1992), para. 6.4. See, mutatis mutandis, S.E. v. Argentina (CCPR/C/38/D/275/1988), para. 5.3. See Janowiec and others v. Russia, judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, 21 October 2013, para. 157.