conduct may indicate inhuman or degrading treatment, that is, a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as expressed in the ECHR judgment in the case Poghosyan v. Georgia (2009), which states that, to protect a prisoner’s health, it was not enough to have him examined and a diagnosis made, but it was essential to provide treatment corresponding to the diagnosis. However, it is expected that in 2014 there will be no further unequal treatment in terms of whether or not prisoners have the status of a mandatory health insurance policy holder with HZZO, because, under the new Mandatory Health Insurance Act, (OG 80/13), all prisoners will acquire the status of a policy holder with HZZO and exercise the rights under mandatory health insurance. Furthermore, according to the Central Office's reply, the question of supplemental health insurance, which is voluntary and personal, will be resolved with HZZO according to the criteria prescribed by the Rules for the establishment and implementation of supplementary health insurance (OG 91/13), which means that some prisoners will, along with the right to primary health insurance, also have the right to supplemental health insurance, while other prisoners will have an option to, if they want, pay for a supplemental health insurance policy. This will also harmonize the treatment of all prisoners with regard to the payment of participation. More precisely, prisoners without a mandatory health insurance policy with HZZO have previously not participated in the cost of health care (covered by the Ministry of Justice), while other prisoners, if without a contracted supplemental health insurance policy, participated in the cost, which often generated great dissatisfaction. 3.3. Treatment of persons deprived of their liberty The fact that during the visits in 2013 no treatment was identified that would indicate the most severe form of violation of human rights – torture – is certainly a positive one. However, the state in which the rule of law is one of the highest constitutional values should not be satisfied only with absence of the most severe form of violation of the rights of persons deprived of their liberty, but should constantly strive to respect the rights of each person in all its actions. One of the key shortcomings observed this year is certainly the unequal treatment of persons deprived of their liberty. Although the unequal treatment may not necessarily constitute a violation of their rights, it is definitely harmful, unless it is based on clear and predefined criteria, which are equally applied to all persons in comparable situations. Even though the reasons for unequal treatment are multiple, they primarily arise from shortcomings in the legal framework, restrictive interpretation or inconsistent application of regulations, and the accommodation conditions. Despite the fact that national legislation governing the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty and conditions in which they are held was generally assessed as good, there is also room for improvement. For example, the fact that the currently valid EPSA was, since its adoption in 1999, corrected, amended or supplemented as much as fourteen times, and that the last consolidated version was published more than ten years ago should by itself represent a justified cause to initiate the drafting of a new text. The reasons for drafting the new EPSA