do so with the intention of training to become a domestic terrorist upon their return.”41 Among the many factors that motivate return are disillusionment, particularly for those driven by “idealism”, and the draw of family, especially mothers.42 Undoubtedly, dangers and conditions of life, including the eventual collapse of the ISIL project in Iraq, also contributed as motivating factors. The diversity of profiles of those returning from conflict zones and their experiences abroad precludes generalized assumptions as to their motivations for return, the roles they have played abroad (e.g., as “fighters” or active supporters of the “Islamic State”) and their intentions upon return.43 Likewise, in relation to returnees from Syria it has been suggested that: “In dealing with returnees, it may be important to differentiate between them based on what they actually did in Syria, their initial intention before going and their reasons for return.” 44 Understanding motivation is crucial to addressing causes and consequences. Moreover, it is also essential to recall that motivation, even if based on violent extremist views, must be distinguished from violent action and an assessment of the intent to do harm when it comes to finding appropriate responses to individual cases of FTFs. Supranational Responses: Obligations to Prevent and Suppress within the Framework of International Law This document focuses on policy recommendations to states. Many of the measures adopted by states have responded to or been triggered by UNSC resolutions, in particular Resolutions 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017), which have been adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and, as a result, impose on states binding obligations under international law. UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014) sets down a far-reaching framework of obligations on states, which provided the impetus for further international, regional and national normative developments from other sources. In particular, the resolution imposed obligations on states to prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of FTFs45 and to establish serious criminal offences to prosecute and penalize a range of conduct. This includes: travel or attempts to travel by individuals to states other than their states of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, preparation or participation in terrorist acts, or to provide or receive terrorist training; the willful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds to finance such travel; or the willful organization, recruitment or “other facilitation” of 41  The UNOCT Report July 2017, p. 5, op. cit., note 27, notes that “not all FTFs go to Syria with the objective of becoming fighters there, even less of committing atrocities”. 42  Ibid. 43  UNCTED Trends Report 2018, op. cit., note 19. 44  See UNOCT Report July 2017, op. cit., note 27. 45  UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014), para 5, op. cit., note 1. 16 Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and Challenges of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters”