as a discriminatory tool targeting specific communities whose members frequently hold a second citizenship.171 While human rights courts and bodies recognize that citizenship rules may impinge on other rights,172 it is important to note that the applicability of human rights does not depend on nationality. Under human rights treaties, obligations are owed by states to all individuals within their jurisdiction. Even where nationality stripping may be considered justified, it should not be assumed that the state can then set aside other human rights obligations in respect of the individuals in question. In this sense, the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of nationality is not coterminous with – and should not be confused with – the other rights at stake. In practice, stripping of nationality often precedes or is linked to other steps that implicate human rights, whether they include denial of entry to a state, deportation or other steps. In particular, the power of states to deprive individuals of their nationality does not necessarily entitle the state to lawfully exclude an individual from its territory, as the right to enter or leave one’s own country173 is not limited to “nationals” under human rights law, but to those with a relevant and substantial link to the state.174 Nor, as a matter of law, does deprivation of nationality affect the right not to be expelled, returned or extradited to another state where there are real risks of serious human rights violations such as torture and other ill-treatment if used (as is often the case) as a precursor to deportation. Due consideration should also be given to the overarching effectiveness of deprivation of nationality, and associated measures such as exclusion or deportation, to meet preventive goals. As already noted, stripping nationality does not automatically entitle the state to take other measures such as excluding or deporting individuals. More broadly, “risk exportation”, whereby measures are taken that seek to protect a particular state by pushing the perceived threat beyond its borders, may not contribute 171  Such concerns have for example been expressed about the debate of such provisions in the Netherlands, see B. Boutin, “Administrative Measures against Foreign Fighters: In Search of Limits and Safeguards”, op. cit., note 155. For similar concerns relating to practices and previously contemplated proposals about citizenship deprivation in other countries, including Belgium, France and the United Kingdom, see also “Europe: Dangerously disproportionate: The ever-expanding national security state in Europe”, Amnesty International, 17 January 2017, pp. 58-63, <www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur01/5342/2017/en/>. 172  For example, Genovese v. Malta, ECtHR, Judgment of 11 October 2011. In an admissibility decision in a terrorism case, the ECtHR recognized that in principle deprivation of citizenship can negatively affect the right to family and private life; see: K2 v. The United Kingdom, ECtHR, Judgment of 9 March 2017. 173  General Comment No. 27 (Article 12: Freedom of movement), CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, 2 November 1999, paras. 19-21. 174  Ibid., (CCPR). The International Law Commission (ILC) has noted that deprivation of citizenship for the sole purpose of expulsion would be “abusive, indeed arbitrary within the meaning of article 15, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”. See Commentary to article 8 of the Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, in Report to the UN General Assembly, International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/69/10, 2014, p. 32. 50 Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and Challenges of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters”