While it is commonly reflected in international commitments, including OSCE commitments, that terrorism must not be identified with any ethnicity, nationality, religion or belief, many challenges remain to convert words to action. In practice, many counter-terrorism policies and programmes to prevent VERLT, FTF recruitment and mobilization have been criticized for exclusively focusing, or having a disproportionate impact, on Muslims and specific ethnic groups.227 The positive obligation of the state to protect individuals against discrimination based on stereotypes, intolerance and racism against Muslims should be recognized in this context.228 Moreover, initiatives to prevent and counter VERLT should be based on sensitive methods and objective criteria, while excluding the direct and indirect discrimination and stigmatization that contributes to FTF recruitment and mobilization. In particular, states should guard against a range of discriminatory assumptions that may underpin VERLT prevention initiatives and other responses to threats and challenges posed by FTFs. The common identification of Muslim belief or practice as a risk factor in “radicalization” of youth, for example, reinforces the stigmatization of entire religious groups, and is not, in any event, supported by the evidence. There is no linear path from the adoption of certain religious beliefs to the acceptance of, or willingness to use, terrorist violence.229 Attempts to detect FTFs based on profiling techniques that use stereotypical assumptions about religion, age, nationality, ethnic or other background are not only at risk of being discriminatory, but are also likely to be ineffective, given that there is no single FTF profile. In countering terrorism, preventing VERLT and effectively addressing FTF threats, a targeted approach focused on what individuals do, not on characteristics or pre-determined assumptions based on ethnicity, religion or gender, is the only human rights compliant approach to avoid errors of approach that have befallen practice to date. 227  See, for example, “Eroding Trust: The UK’s Prevent Counter-Extremism Strategy in Health and Education”, Open Society Justice Initiative, op. cit., note 215; UN Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism, UN Doc. A/ HRC/31/65, op. cit., note 34. 228  The UN Human Rights Committee has addressed the positive obligations of states to counter discrimination by private actors, for example, by recommending Sweden “an educational campaign through the media to protect persons of foreign extraction, in particular Arabs and Muslims, from stereotypes associating them with terrorism, extremism and fanaticism”; see: Concluding Observations: Sweden, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE, 24 April 2002. 229  “Radicalization” conceptions, such as the conveyor belt or slippery slope arguments, suggesting that there is such a linear path or progression from the adoption of certain religious beliefs to the acceptance of, or indeed willingness to use, terrorist violence are disputed and not supported by empirical evidence. For risks of pre- or misconceptions about the groups that are most susceptible to “radicalization” or violent extremism, see also: UN Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/65, op. cit., note 34. Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and Challenges of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” 63