25.The representatives of the Ministry of Justice noted that the government had made an assessment prior to the ratification of the OPCAT that the institutions that had now been designated as NPMs fulfilled the requirements of the OPCAT as they were already monitoring places where persons were deprived of their liberty. However, they recognized that the two institutions themselves had expressed an uncertainty as to whether they would be in a position to meet these requirements, including the monitoring function. The representatives also noted that the OPCAT refers to a system of regular visits but it does stipulate how often such visits should take place. The government had not found any reason to establish a dual system when Sweden already had institutions with monitoring tasks, and it highlighted that the Parliamentary Ombudsmen were fully independent from the government. 26.The representatives of the Ministry of Justice underlined that the Ombudsmen are responsible to the parliament, not the government. Financial resources are allocated to the institution from the parliament, taking into account the institution’s annual report, but it is for the Ombudsmen themselves to decide how they want to distribute the funds received. The representatives noted that in the government’s view the visits undertaken were regular enough but if the activities of the two existing institutions were deemed insufficient to fulfil the obligations under the OPCAT, the ratification bill included a reference to the possibility of revisiting the designation decision in the future. 27.As regards the Chancellor of Justice, the representatives of the Ministry of Justice observed that he or she is appointed by the Swedish government and represents the government in various legal matters as its ombudsman. However, the final decision as regards budgetary funds for the Chancellor’s Office lay with the Parliament. 28.In the course of the meeting, the SPT delegation referred to three objections previously voiced by the institutions themselves; the Parliamentary Ombudsmen had noted that the designation might influence their independence, and both institutions had objected to the fact that no additional resources had been allocated and that this would affect the regularity of visits. The SPT delegation also noted that in their view new tasks required more resources. C. Discussions with the NPMs 1. The Parliamentary Ombudsmen 29.The SPT delegation had a fruitful discussion with the four Parliamentary Ombudsmen. The Ombudsmen described their powers, many of which fall within the remits of OPCAT, while others go beyond it. These powers included, inter alia, carrying out (unannounced) visits, a right to start investigations at its own initiative (sometimes as a result of such visits) and to examine individual complaints. The Ombudsmen reiterated their reluctance to perform the NPM functions and reaffirmed that in the present circumstances they did not consider themselves to be the NPM. While recognizing that some of the characteristics of the NPM were similar to the Ombudsman function, including the possibility of visiting places of detention, the Ombudsmen stated that their freedom of action and independence would be limited if they were to be made responsible for all monitoring visits, and that they lacked the necessary resources to be able to carry out the task. The Ombudsmen also considered their institution to be driven by complaints received and mostly reactive in character and that their ability to initiate inquiries and work in a preventive way, as required by the OPCAT, was therefore limited. 30.The foremost objection of the Ombudsmen was that their designation was of a constitutional nature and they emphasized their independence for the government and the parliament. The Ombudsmen cannot ever receive instructions from the government as this would be in contradiction with their well-established independent position as arranged in the constitution. Assuming the role of the NPM as required by the OPCAT and thus undertaking the mandatory methodology of regular visits would be similar to receiving instructions from the government. This would jeopardize the Ombudsmen’s discretion to choose how to best discharge their mandate as assigned by law and would conspire against the extraordinary character of the institution. 31.The Ombudsmen also raised concerns about the lack of additional resources allocated to undertake the NPM functions and highlighted their limited number of staff. With regard to the expertise of the Ombudsmen and their staff, the Parliamentary Ombudsmen observed that they were all lawyers. The visits were carried out by one of the four Ombudsmen plus a team. The office does not have medical expertise itself and it does not employ outside experts. It underlined that it is mainly interested in the legal aspects. All in all, the Ombudsmen did not consider themselves to have been formally designated as a NPM and reiterated that they firmly declined to be entrusted with this task. 2. The Chancellor of Justice 32.The SPT also met with the Office of the Chancellor of Justice (Justitiekanslern). The Office noted that it had wide supervisory powers. It also underlined that the Chancellor was appointed by the government but it did not take any instructions from the government and the Chancellor could not be dismissed. 33.The main concern expressed by the Office was that it had not been given sufficient resources as required to perform the additional tasks deriving from its designation as a NPM, including regular inspections. The Office also observed that it saw itself and operated also as a complaint driven and thus reactive institution and that all staff members were lawyers. However, the Office considered that if sufficient resources were to be allocated, it could perform the task, including by setting up an investigative, multi-disciplinary team. D. Evaluation 34.The SPT would like to stress that it has the utmost respect for the work of these two experienced and distinguished institutions. Based on the results of the meetings with these institutions, however, the SPT delegation was left with a certain degree of perplexity as to the prospects for these bodies to fulfil the NPM mandate. Indeed, the designation of the Ombudsmen and the Chancellor of Justice as NPMs does not appear to have produced the slightest impact on their day-to-day methodologies and practices. They continue to do what they have always done and regard themselves as essentially reactive bodies. The SPT delegation could not