President Charles Taylor). It should be noted that this particular challenge is not unique to hybrid tribunals,102 and that Chapter VII powers do not automatically lead to State cooperation. Nonetheless, the absence of Security Council endorsement has led to questions about the overall efficacy and international standing of hybrid tribunals.103 Securing adequate cooperation from States other than the host country is essential to many of a court’s main functions, such as the transfer of detainees for medical treatment, witness protection or relocation, the transfer of witnesses, the surrender of the accused and the enforcement of sentences. Hybrid tribunals need a capacity to develop State relations that enable them to conduct these functions (e.g., staff with experience in conducting diplomatic relations at the regional and international levels and negotiating agreements). They should also establish groups of supportive States (such as the Group of Interested States for the Special Court for Sierra Leone or the Friends of the International Criminal Court). Such bodies should be allocated duties to raise awareness and financial and political support for the particular initiative. Other tools such as Interpol red notices and other means of international cooperation may help to obtain custody of the accused if they travel outside the jurisdiction of an uncooperative State. Regional or multilateral organizations should be sought out to assist in applying such pressure. Further solutions to these problems must come from a more consistent and coordinated approach at the international level by the Security Council itself. E. Funding Funding is one of the core challenges to international justice today. Throughout their lifespans, the annual budgets for the ad hoc Tribunals have grown steadily and, at the moment, each is consuming around $120 million a year, a cost that has been driven up by the “completion strategy”. ICTY has so far spent approximately $16 million per individual conviction/ acquittal in the first instance (including all costs on investigations and the appeals process to date). These numbers may seem very high, but are not completely incongruous with complex criminal trials in developed jurisdictions. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that these high costs are straining relations with donors and that efficiencies will have to be achieved. The Special Court for Sierra Leone has a slimmer 102 In their recent addresses to the Security Council, the ICTY President and Prosecutor highlighted the continued lack of State cooperation in handing over high-level indictees such as Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic and Ante Gotovina. 103  lthough UNTAET concluded a memorandum of understanding with Indonesia, it has received no cooperation in the handA ing over of accused or evidence. Similarly, repeated requests to Nigeria to hand over former President Charles Taylor to the Special Court for Sierra Leone have been disregarded to date. Finally, many Serbs remain out of reach for the Kosovo trial panels, and it is particularly complex to arrange for extradition, as Kosovo is not an independent State and negotiations must be conducted through Serbia and Montenegro. Another disadvantage of lacking Chapter VII powers is that, in the case of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the ad hoc Tribunals took the position that they had no legal ground for giving direct assistance to it in the form of temporarily housing a detainee that posed a particular security threat in Sierra Leone. 37