son concerned in the National Centre for the Prevention of Dissocial Behaviours111. A similar opinion was voiced by the Commissioner of Human Rights who joined the proceedings112. The CHR pointed out that Article 2.3 of the Act may be the basis for applying the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on security measures, provided that this does not lead to deprivation or limitation of personal freedom of the participant of the proceedings. In this context one cannot forget about the role of prison managers filing motions to courts based on Article 9 of the Act. They should act sufficiently in advance, so that a valid court decision is issued prior to the end of penalty execution and release of a person concerned. The postulate of efficiency of proceedings relates also to courts (in the scope of their operation) which examine prison manager motions and appeals in the case concerned. As far as the need to amend currently applicable legislation, Commissioner of Human Rights applied to the Prime Minister on 27 February 2019113. Psychiatric hospitals In 2019, the National Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture conducted visits to 2 psychiatric hospitals for adults114, as well as to the National Centre for Forensic Psychiatry for Minors in Garwolin (conclusions from the visits were described in the part of this Report concerning the rights of minors). The NMPT delegation’s aim was to verify the application of a security measure involving the placement of a perpetrator of a criminal act in a psychiatric facility due to his/her insanity while committing the act concerned (Article 93a § 1 (4) of the Criminal Code). 111 112 113 114 50 Supreme Court resolution of 30 January 2019 (Case no III CZP 75/18). The Supreme Court also pointed out that there should not be any doubts that orders and prohibitions within security measure application proceedings cannot interfere with personal freedom which is guaranteed by the Constitution. In the Supreme Court’s opinion a reference included in Article 2.3 of the Act cannot be construed as an authorisation to imprisonment for in principle unlimited time and without subjective and objective assumptions being clearly defines. The Supreme Court also underlined that in the Act itself one cannot find provisions ensuring adequate standards of controlling the stay of a person at the Centre during security measure application proceedings. At the same time the Supreme Court noticed that there may be situations where an isolation of a participant – in the period following release from prison and before a valid termination of proceedings to be placed in the Centre – shall become justified or even necessary. To this end one has to change the applicable laws. In the Supreme Court’s opinion, the legislator should fulfil an existing gap with clear and precise regulations which do not raise any doubts in terms of conformity with the Constitution, axiology or interpretation. Moreover, the Supreme Court held that art. 23 et. seq. of the Mental Health Protection Act of 19 August 1994 (consolidated text: Journal of Laws (Dz. U.) of 2017, item 882) may be applied ad hoc (if it is justified by statute). CHR submission dated 29 November 2018, Case no IV.567.4.2018. General intervention of CHR of 27 February 2019, IX.517.1702.2017. The CHR pointed out i.a. that despite the fact that, since the passing of the Supreme Court resolution, no court has written to the Centre manager to release the patient who was placed there based on the Act of 22 November 2013, one should be aware of the state’s liability for damages in all those cases. Jan Mazurkiewicz Mazowieckie Specialized Healthcare Centre based in Pruszków (hereinafter MSCZ), (KMP.574.2.2019); Mieczysław Kaczyński Neuropsychiatric Hospital in Lublin (KMP.574.3.2019). PART IV – Situation in places of detention