CCPR/C/115/D/2289/2013 futile.12 In the present case, the author alleged that his rights under various provisions of the Covenant had been violated in a manner that directly reflected on the legality of his death sentence. Having been notified of the communication and the request by the Committee for interim measures of protection, the State party committed a serious breach of its obligations under the Optional Protocol by executing the alleged victim before the Committee had concluded its consideration of the communication. 5.5 The Committee recalls that interim measures under rule 92 of its rules of procedure, adopted in accordance with article 39 of the Covenant, are essential to its role under the Optional Protocol, in order to avoid irreparable damage to the victim of an alleged violation. Flouting of that rule, especially by irreversible measures, such as, in the present case, the execution of Mr. Selyun, undermines the protection of Covenant rights through the Optional Protocol.13 Consideration of admissibility 6.1 Before considering any claims contained in a communication, the Committee must, in accordance with rule 93 of its rules of procedure, decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. 6.2 The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 6.3 With regard to the requirement laid down in article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol, the Committee takes note of the State party’s argument that Mr. Selyun had not exhausted all domestic remedies at the time of submission of his communication, in particular in view of the fact that his application for a presidential pardon was still pending. In this regard, and in the light of the information regarding the execution of the author, the Committee reiterates its previous jurisprudence, according to which the presidential pardon is an extraordinary remedy14 and as such does not constitute an effective remedy for the purposes of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol. Furthermore, in the present case the pardon could not on its own have constituted a sufficient remedy for the violations alleged. Therefore, the Committee considers that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from considering the communication. 6.4 The Committee takes note of the author’s allegations that his rights under article 9 (1) and (2) and article 14 (1) of the Covenant were violated. It notes that the State party has not refuted those allegations. However, in the absence of further detailed information, explanations or evidence in support of those claims on file, the Committee finds these allegations insufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility, and declares this part of the communication inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 6.5 The Committee considers that the author’s remaining claims, raising issues under article 6 (1) and (2), article 7, article 9 (3) and (4) and article 14 (2) and (3) (b), (d) and (g) 12 13 14 6 See, inter alia, communications No. 1276/2004, Idieva v. Tajikistan, Views adopted on 31 March 2009, para. 7.3; and No. 2120/2011, Kovaleva and Kozyar v. Belarus, Views adopted on 29 October 2012, para. 9.4. See, inter alia, communications No. 964/2001, Saidova v. Tajikistan, Views adopted on 8 July 2004, para. 4.4; No. 1280/2004; Tolipkhuzhaev v. Uzbekistan, Views adopted on 22 July 2009, para. 6.4; and Kovaleva and Kozyar v. Belarus, para. 9.5. See communications No. 1033/2001, Singarasa v. Sri Lanka, Views adopted on 21 July 2004, para. 6.4; No. 1132/2002, Chisanga v. Zambia, Views adopted on 18 October 2005, para. 6.3; and Koveleva and Kozyar v. Belarus, para. 10.4.