perpetrators of torture, several governments, such as France, Barbados, Panama and Spain, advocated an extension of the definition covering also private individuals. Germany did not go as far but wished to include also non-State actors who exercise authority over others and whose authority is comparable to government authority. Since other governments, including the United States, United Kingdom, Morocco and Austria, insisted on a traditional State-centred definition, the Working Group finally agreed on a US compromise proposal which extended State responsibility to the consent or acquiescence of a public official. Since the delegations could not agree on a definition of the term ‘public official’, the Austrian proposal to add the phrase ‘or other person acting in an official capacity’ was adopted.” (footnotes excluded) On this basis Mr Powles submits that the compromise was the inclusion of non-State actors who act with the consent or acquiescence of a public official and not the expansion of the definition of “person acting in an official capacity” beyond persons or entities who in fact act for or on behalf of the State. 31. It seems clear from this account by Nowak and McArthur that, in the result, the intention was at least to exclude from the definition the conduct of private individuals acting in a private capacity. The question is whether it was intended to go further and to include within the definition acts of de facto authorities exercising governmental functions. On behalf of the appellant, Mr Powles draws particular attention to the reference by Nowak and McArthur to insistence “on a traditional State-centred definition” and submits that it supports the view that conduct in an official capacity must be attributable to the State. It is not entirely clear, however, what is meant by this term. A later passage in Nowak and McArthur, on which the prosecution relies, suggests that it may be intended simply to exclude perpetrators acting entirely in a personal capacity. “118. The term ‘other person acting in an official capacity’ goes, however, clearly beyond State officials. It was inserted on the proposal of Austria in order to meet the concerns of the Federal Republic of Germany that certain non-State actors whose authority is comparable to governmental authority should also be held accountable. These de facto authorities seem to be similar to those ‘political organizations’ which, according to article 7(2)(i) ICC Statute, can be held accountable for the crime of enforced disappearance before the ICC. One might think of rebel, guerrilla or insurgent groups who exercise de facto authority in certain regions or of warring factions in so-called ‘failing States’. Page 15