While these passages may be read as providing some support for the appellant’s case, it is important to bear in mind that neither was addressing the specific question which arises in these proceedings. The first was addressing the distinct questions of whether torture under the Convention should include private acts of torture and whether it should extend beyond acts committed by public officials. The second was addressing the requirement that torture should be committed for a specific purpose connected to the actor’s public function. As a result, these passages cast little light on the meaning of the words “acting in an official capacity”. 34. The same is true of the following statement by the Chairman-Rapporteur, Mr J H Burgers in his report of the Working Group dated 25 March 1983 addressing whether the offence of torture should attract universal jurisdiction: “Most speakers were in favour of the principle of universal jurisdiction, holding it to be essential in securing the effectiveness of the Convention. Territorial jurisdiction would not suffice to punish torture effectively as a State policy, under the definition of article 1.” (E/CN.4/1983/63 at para 21) 35. While these aspects of the travaux preparatoires may be inconclusive as to the meaning of the words “public official or other person acting in an official capacity” in article 1, they do, however, cast some light on certain objectives of the Convention. Two points, in particular, emerge with some clarity. 36. First, it was the intention that the offence defined in article 1 should not include purely private acts of torture with no official character or connection. While the representatives of some States in the Working Group considered that the offence should not be limited to the conduct of public officials since the purpose of the Convention was to eradicate any and all activities which result in torture, others considered that such purely private acts were not matters of particular interest to the international community and that each State could normally be expected to take action according to its criminal law against private persons who had committed such private acts of torture so that there was no need for its regulation by an international convention. The prevailing view was that acts of torture committed by or under the responsibility of public officials for purposes connected with their public functions were different in nature from, and inherently more serious than, those inflicted by a private person, and that the elimination of the former category of torture should be the primary target of the Convention. (See Nowak and McArthur, paras 33, 40; Burgers and Danelius, pp 45, 118-120; E/CN.4/1314, 19 December 1978, para 29.) Thus, international action was primarily designed to cover situations where national action was otherwise least likely (E/CN.4/L.170, 12 March 1979, paras 17, 18). To the extent that the words “a public official or other person acting in an official capacity” in article 1 were intended to achieve that result, they should not exclude Page 18