57. This observation applies with equal force to the scope of the offence defined in article 1 of UNCAT. While in the present case the statehood of Liberia is not in question, the issue nevertheless serves to demonstrate a difficulty inherent in the appellant’s proposed reading of article 1 which must be capable of uniform application. As Mr Swaroop QC, on behalf of the intervener, pointed out, it now seems to be accepted on behalf of the appellant that the offence defined in article 1 can apply in the case of a person acting on behalf of a de facto entity which is not recognised as a State. 58. Secondly, in a situation where two or more entities are competing and are both performing governmental functions within the territory of a State, the appellant’s suggested reading of article 1 would require a determination as to which of them is, at any given time, to be regarded as constituting the government of the State ie which is to be regarded as the de jure government and which is merely exercising de facto control or authority. On the appellant’s suggested reading of the provisions, only a person acting in an official capacity on behalf of the de jure government of the State could commit the offence defined in article 1. How is such an evaluation to be performed? At the oral hearing before us, Mr Powles stated that he was neutral as to whether recognition of the entity as the de jure government of the State was required and that while it could be relevant in some circumstances it is not relevant in this case. The practice of States in this regard varies enormously and often turns on policy as opposed to legal considerations. Whereas the United Kingdom has in the past recognised governments, it no longer does so (HL Debates, vol 48, cols 1121-1122, 28 April 1980; HC Debates, vol 983, Written Answers, cols 277-279, 25 April 1980 and HC Debates, vol 985, Written Answers, col 385, 23 May 1980; Republic of Somalia v Woodhouse Drake & Carey (Suisse) SA [1993] QB 54; C Warbrick, “The New British Policy on Recognition of Governments”, (1983) 30 ICLQ 568). Resort to State practice in recognising or not recognising governments is, therefore, incapable of providing a uniform standard by which the Convention can be applied. 59. Thirdly, Mr Powles accepted that in one situation article 1 does apply to a quasi-governmental entity exercising de facto control over territory. He accepted that the decision of the CAT in Elmi, considered at paras 49 to 52 above, was correct in applying article 1 to a body exercising de facto control over territory in Somalia, but sought to distinguish this as an exceptional situation because in that case there was no central government. However, it is difficult to see any basis on which this situation can be distinguished from others in which governmental functions are being performed by bodies in de facto control of territory. As the Court of Appeal observed in the present case (at para 55), once it is accepted that the words “person acting in an official capacity” are wide enough to cover factions exercising governmental functions in territory over which they exercise de facto control, it is difficult to see why there should be any such limitation to the circumstances of Elmi, Page 28