alleged to control defined territory, control populations within its power, and to have entered into agreements with other governments. It has a president, a legislature, and its own currency. These circumstances readily appear to satisfy the criteria for a state in all aspects of international law. Moreover, it is likely that the state action concept, where applicable for some violations like ‘official’ torture, requires merely the semblance of official authority. The inquiry, after all, is whether a person purporting to wield official power has exceeded internationally recognized standards of civilized conduct, not whether statehood in all its formal aspects exists.” 67. On behalf of the appellant it is submitted that the Court of Appeals here placed considerable emphasis on the need for the entity under consideration to possess significant State-like qualities. Moreover, it is said that the State-like qualities possessed by Srpska were of a considerably different order from those of NPFL as it existed during the relevant period of 1990 in Liberia. However, in common with most of the other US authorities relied on by the appellant, Kadic concerns the distinct question of actionability under ATCA. Furthermore, to the extent that it may be relevant, Kadic, notwithstanding the use of the language of statehood, does not support the appellant’s reading of article 1, UNCAT. On the contrary, the Court of Appeals apparently considered that official torture required “merely the semblance of official authority” and could be committed by “a person purporting to wield official power” who had exceeded internationally recognised standards of civilised conduct. In the result, the conduct of a de facto governmental authority was held to constitute official torture. 68. The same is true of a further US decision on which the appellant relies, Mehinovic v Vuckovic, 198 F Supp 2d 1322 (2002) (US District Court, N D Georgia, Atlanta Division). The plaintiffs sued a former soldier in the Bosnian Serb Army alleging, inter alia, acts of torture. The District Court held that it had jurisdiction under both ATCA and TVPA. With regard to ATCA, it noted that official torture violated obligatory norms of customary international law and, after referring to the definition in article 1, UNCAT observed that “… the beatings carried out by Vuckovic and his accomplices were clearly perpetrated, instigated, and acquiesced in, by persons acting in an official capacity as part of the police or military forces of Republika Srpska.” (at p 1346) The appellant relies in particular on the following passage: Page 33