CAT/C/35/D/238/2003 Page 8 counsel before the Committee was acting pro bono in respect of those proceedings only. Neither he nor others could be expected to operate pro bono in respect of any judicial review proceedings. 7.2 As to the original reasons for inadmissibility, the complainant submitted it was clear that both elements were criteria on which the conclusion was founded. This was confirmed by the context of paragraph 7.4 of the original case. Were it otherwise, it would have been pointless for the Committee to make any remarks on the legal aid question. As both parties had made submissions on the legal aid issue, paragraph 7.3 was necessary to address those points and was thus far from superfluous. At a minimum, the decision should be reviewed to clarify whether, and on what conditions, judicial review is an available remedy even in the absence of legal aid. 7.3 Turning to whether judicial review must be pursued despite the absence of legal aid, the complainant pointed out that article 22, paragraph 5, only requires available and effective remedies to be exhausted by a complainant. Were the complainant to represent himself, with little knowledge of Norwegian law or language, against skilled lawyers of the State, domestic remedies would not be “effective” within the meaning of article 22. 7.4 The complainant argued that human rights treaties must be interpreted so as to make them effective. If complaints are held inadmissible for non-exhaustion in circumstances where domestic remedies are, in fact, unavailable, a victim has remedies neither at the national nor international level. 7.5 The complainant invoked the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee, which had found communications admissible under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in circumstances where legal aid was unavailable.2 7.6 The complainant observed that in Norway, many people received legal aid in different categories of cases. He easily satisfied the economic criteria. Thus, in support of his claim for legal aid, he invoked the doctrine of “positive obligations” for the State party to prevent human rights violations, as part of the general obligation to secure effectively the right to non-refoulement. The complainant pointed out that if a right to legal aid existed, it would certainly be considered relevant to an assessment of the exhaustion of domestic remedies, and thus the unavailability of legal aid should be treated similarly. 7.7 The complainant rejected the State party’s misgivings about the results of holding the present case admissible. Firstly, it would not result in all unsuccessful asylum seekers pleading before the Committee. A possible violation of article 3 would arise only in few cases. In any event, the outcome on the merits would be a more important guide to the future. The Committee should thus be wary of the adverse 2 The complainant cited Campbell v Jamaica Case No 248/1987, Views adopted on 30 March 1992; Little v Jamaica Case No 283/1988, Views adopted on 24 July 1989; Ellis v Jamaica Case No 276/1988, Views adopted on 28 July 1992; Wright v Jamaica Case No 349/1989, Views adopted on 27 July 1992; Currie v Jamaica Case No 377/1989, Views adopted on 29 March 1994; Hylton v Jamaica Case No 600/1994, Views adopted on 16 August 1996; Gallimore v Jamaica Case No 680/1996, Views adopted on 23 July 1999; and Smart v Trinidad & Tobago Case No 672/1995, Views adopted on 29 July 1998.