CAT/C/60/D/653/2015 the Board considered it a fact that an asylum seeker had been subjected to torture and risked being subjected to torture in connection with persecution for reasons falling within the scope of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in case of return to his or her country of origin, the Board would grant residence under section 7 (1) of the Aliens Act (“Convention status”), provided that the conditions for doing so had otherwise been met. Furthermore, following a specific assessment, a residence permit could be granted under section 7 (1) of the Aliens Act if an asylum seeker was found to have been subjected to torture before fleeing to Denmark and his or her substantial fear resulting from the abuse was therefore considered to be well founded, even though an objective assessment indicated that return would not entail any risk of further persecution. 4.7 Moreover, the Refugee Appeals Board would find that the conditions for granting residence under section 7 (2) of the Aliens Act (“protection status”) were met if specific and individual factors rendered it probable that the asylum seeker would be at a real risk of being subjected to torture in case of return to his or her country of origin. The fact that an asylum seeker had been subjected to torture might also have an impact on the assessment of evidence made by the Board because individuals who had previously been subjected to torture could not always be expected to give an account of the facts of the case in the same way as individuals who had not been subjected to torture. That approach reflects the approach described in the Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.6 4.8 Where torture was invoked as one of the grounds for applying for asylum, the Refugee Appeals Board might sometimes find it necessary to obtain additional details on such torture before making a determination on the case. It may, for example, order that the asylum seeker be examined for signs of torture. Any such decision would typically not be made before a hearing before the Board, as the Board often needed to hear the asylum seeker’s statement and assess his or her credibility. If the Board considered that the asylum seeker had been or might have been subjected to torture but found, upon assessing the asylum seeker’s situation, that there was no real risk of torture upon return at that time, it would normally not order an examination. The Board would not normally order an examination for signs of torture when the asylum seeker lacked credibility throughout the proceedings, in which case the Board would have to reject the asylum seeker’s statement about torture in its entirety. 4.9 Concerning the weight given to the asylum seeker’s credibility relative to that given to the medical information available, the State party referred to the Committee’s decision in communication No. 209/2002, M.O. v. Denmark,7 in which the complainant’s statements on torture and the relative medical information provided were set aside owing to the complainant’s general lack of credibility. In that decision, the Committee referred to paragraph 8 of its general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3, pursuant to which questions about the credibility of a complainant and the presence of relevant factual inconsistencies in the claim were pertinent to the Committee’s deliberations as to whether the complainant would be in danger of being tortured upon return. The State party also referred to the Committee’s decision in communication No. 466/2011, Alp v. Denmark,8 in which it found that the State party’s authorities had thoroughly evaluated all the evidence presented by the complainant, had found the complainant to lack credibility and did not consider it necessary to order a medical examination. It further referred to paragraphs 77-82 of the judgment delivered by the European Court of Human Rights on 20 March 1991 in Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden (application No. 15576/89). 4.10 When torture was invoked as a ground for claiming asylum, factors like the nature of the torture, including the extent, grossness and frequency of the abuse, and the asylum seeker’s age might be accorded importance in the determination of the case. It was 6 7 8 4 May 2014. The State party referred to paragraphs 207-212 of the handbook. Decision adopted on 12 November 2003, paras. 6.4-6.6. Decision adopted on 14 May 2014.